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Giannella Lecture
WHAT IS "MORALITY' ANYWAY.?*
MICHAEL J. PERRY"*
Much contemporary moral philosophy, particularly but not only in the
English-speaking world, has given such a narrow focus to morality ....
This moral philosophy has tended to focus on what it is right to do rather
than on what it is good to be, on defining the content of obligation rather
than the nature of the good life .... This philosophy has accredited a
cramped and truncated view of morality in a narrow sense, as well as of
the whole range of issues involved in the attempt to live the best possible
life, and this not only among professional philosophers, but with a wider
public.
-Charles Taylor'
* © 1999. This Essay was the basis of the Donald A. Giannella Memorial
Lecture, which I delivered at the Villanova University School of Law on October 6,
1999. An earlier version of the Essay was the basis of a lecture I delivered in the
Faith & Justice Lecture Series sponsored in the Winter/Spring of 1999 by the
Georgetown University Law Center. It was also the basis of several faculty
workshops during 1998-99: American University, the Washington College of Law;
the Indiana University (Bloomington) School of Law; the University of North
Carolina School of Law; the University of San Diego School of Law; and the Wake
Forest University School of Law. I am grateful for the comments I received in all
these venues. For his written comments, I am grateful to Mike Corrado (North
Carolina). I owe a special debt of gratitude, for their correspondence and
comments, to Peter Cicchino (American University), Chris Eberle (Concordia
University), Steve Smith (Notre Dame), and R. George Wright (Samford
University).
Some of this Essay revisits some issues addressed in my book, MICHAEL J.
PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES (1998). I am grateful to the
Oxford University Press for permission to use some passages from The Idea of
Human Rights in this Essay.
** University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest University.
1. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDEN-
TrrY 3 (1989) [hereinafter TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF]. Taylor continues:
[Such moral theories] leave us with nothing to say to someone who asks
why he should be moral.... But this could be misleading, if we seemed to
be asking how we could convince someone who saw none of the point of
our moral beliefs. There is nothing we can do to 'prove' we are right to
such a person. But imagine him to be asking another question: he could
be asking us to make plain the point of our moral code, to articulate
what's uniquely valuable in cleaving to these injunctions. Then the impli-
cation of these theories is that we have nothing to say which can impart
insight. We can wax rhetorical and propagandize, but we can't say what's
good or valuable about [the injunctions], or why they command assent.
Id. at 87. Taylor's book Sources of the Self, is, among other things, a powerful argu-
ment for a different, larger understanding of "moral." See id. at 4, 14-15, 63-64, 79,
(69)
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M ANY law professors spend a lot of time these days talking about "mo-rality." Inde d, one of the most prominent legal academics of his
generation, Ronald Dworkin, is, whatever else he may be, a moral philoso-
pher. As is another influential Oxford law professor: Dworkin's colleague,
and nemesis, John Finnis.2 The University of Chicago Law School has ap-
pointed a moral philosopher, Martha Nussbaum, to its faculty.3 A found-
ing father of "law and economics," Richard Posner, although not himself a
moral philosopher, devoted the major part of his Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lectures at Harvard, in October 1997, to savaging what he called "aca-
demic moralism."4
The penetration of legal discourse by moral discourse is not surpris-
ing. Moral controversy is often at the center of legal controversy; in partic-
ular, controversy about whether one or another practice (abortion,
homosexual sexual conduct, physician-assisted suicide, etc.) is, at least in
some instances, morally permissible is often at the center of controversy
about whether the practice should be, at least in some instances, legally
permissible.
Not that one who believes that particular conduct is immoral will al-
ways want the law to ban the conduct. One who believes that (particular)
conduct is immoral may have good reasons to want the law not to ban the
conduct.5 (Similarly, one who believes that conduct-e.g., physician-as-
87; see also Charles Taylor, A Most Peculiar Institution, in WORLD, MIND, & ETHICS:
ESSAYS ON THE ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF BERNARD WILLIAMS 132 (J.E.J. Altham &
Ross Harrison eds., 1995) [hereinafter Taylor, A Most Peculiar Institution]; Charles
Taylor, Iris Murdoch & Moral Philosophy, in IRIs MURDOCH AND THE SEARCH FOR
HUMAN GOODNESS 3 (Maria Antonaccio & William Schweiker eds., 1996) [herein-
after Taylor, Murdoch & Moral Philosophy].
2. Finnis divides his time between Oxford and Notre Dame. Before he re-
cently retired from his position at Oxford, Dworkin divided his time between Ox-
ford and New York University. I understand that Dworkin will now divide his time
between University College London and New York University. The heated debate
between Dworkin and Finnis is longstanding. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAw
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 221-22 (1980). For a recent instance of the debate, see gen-
erally Transcript, The Fifth Annual Fritz B. Burns Lecture: Euthanasia, Morality, and the
Law, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1465 (1997).
3. I could go on listing the names of law professors, or former law professors,
who are, whatever else they may be, moral philosophers: Charles Fried (Harvard),
Michael Moore (University of Pennsylvania), Joseph Raz (Oxford and Columbia),
Jeremy Waldron (Columbia) and so on. Some of my own work addresses issues in
moral philosophy. See, e.g., MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR
INQUIRIES (1998) [hereinafter PERRY, FOUR INQUIRIES]; MICHAELJ. PERRY, MORAL-
irY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988) [hereinafter PERRY, MORALITY].
4. See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Political Theory, 111
HARv. L. REV. 1638, 1639 (1998). For Posner's explanation of what he means by
"academic moralism," see infra note 102 and accompanying text.
5. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
MORALITY 42-43 (1993) (listing such reasons). The United States Constitution has
been interpreted to forbid government to ban abortion, which is conduct many
believe to be immoral. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973). I comment on
the Supreme Court's decision in Roe in my book, MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEO-
PLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Cf Richard
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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sisted suicide-is sometimes a morally acceptable option may have good
reasons to want the law to ban the conduct.6 ) Nonetheless, with respect to
conduct believed by many to be immoral, the claim that the conduct is
immoral is typically an important part of the argument that the law ought
to ban, or otherwise disfavor, the conduct.7 It is worth noting that the law
can disfavor conduct without banning it. Consider, for example, the case
of same-sex marriages, which exist in spite of the fact that the law does not
recognize them. 8 For the law not to recognize same-sex marriages-that
A. Posner, Reply to Critics of The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 - Av. L.
REv. 1796, 1814 (1998) ("That a case involves a moral issue does not mean that the
court must resolve that issue in order to decide the case.").
6. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997) (discussing ban on
physician-assisted suicide). In Glucksburg, the Supreme Court noted that:
[The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law] expressed its con-
cern that, because depression is difficult to diagnose, physicians and med-
ical professionals often fail to respond adequately to seriously ill patients'
needs. Thus, legal physician-assisted suicide could make it more difficult
for the State to protect depressed or mentally ill persons ....
Id. at 731. The Court then added:
[T]he State has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including
the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and
mistakes .... We have recognized... the real risk of subtle coercion and
undue influence in end-of-life situations. Similarly, the New York Task
Force warned that "legalizing physician-assisted suicide would pose
profound risks to many individuals who are ill and vulnerable .... The
risk of harm is greatest for the many individuals in our society whose au-
tonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty, lack of ac-
cess to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a stigmatized
social group." If physician-assisted suicide were permitted, many might
resort to it to spare their families the substantial financial burden of end-
of-life health-care costs.
The State's interest here goes beyond protecting the vulnerable from
coercion; it extends to protecting disabled and terminally ill persons
from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and "societal indif-
ference." The State's assisted-suicide ban reflects and reinforces its policy
that the lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must be no less
valued than the lives of the young and healthy, and that a seriously dis-
abled person's suicidal impulses should be interpreted and treated the
same way as anyone else's.
Id. at 731-32.
7. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 7, at 43. It bears emphasis here that, as Kent
Greenawalt has observed:
[M]uch legal enforcement of morality is uncontroversial and rarely dis-
cussed. Disagreement arises only when the law enforces aspects of moral-
ity that do not involve protecting others from fairly direct harms. More
precisely, people raise questions about legal requirements (1) to perform
acts that benefit others, (2) to refrain from acts that cause indirect harm
to others, (3) to refrain from acts that cause harm to themselves, (4) to
refrain from acts that -offend others, and (5) to refrain from acts that
others believe are immoral.
Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 710,
710 (1995).
8. See David McCarthy Matzko, Homosexuality and the Practices of Marriage, 13
MOD. THEOLOGY 371, 372 (1997):
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is, for the law not to extend to homosexual marriages the benefits it grants
to heterosexual marriages-is not for the law to ban same-sex marriages,
but it is for the law to disfavor them.
As I said, the penetration of legal discourse by moral discourse is not
surprising. Nor is it problematic. In a recent essay, Jean Bethke Elshtain is
sharply and, in my judgment, rightly critical of those who argue that we
ought to de-moralize the law: "[O]ne can rightly put ethical and moral
questions to the law and expect ethical and moral answers."9 Indeed,
Elshtain even suggests that we think of "the law professor as an ethical and
moral philosopher of sorts."' 0 According to Elshtain, "the law professor as
philosopher is in the best position to respect and to transmit" what
Elshtain calls "the law's moral and philosophical enterprise."'" In any
event, talk about morality, mainly in the form of moral argument, is perva-
sive in the contemporary legal academy.
Nothwithstanding all our morality-talk, however, it is often obscure
what we citizens of the legal academy, and others, are talking about-and
often clear that we are not all talking about the same thing-when we talk
(argue) about "morality."
I
Happily for us Bulls fans, there was no Game 7 in the 1998 NBA
Finals. The Bulls won Game 6-and with it, their sixth national champi-
onship-when Michael Jordan sunk a breathtaking jump shot in the final
seconds of play.12 But if there had been a Game 7-a game that would
have been Jordan's last as a Bull and even as a professional-I would have
had a reason not to be doing what I was doing the evening Game 7 would
have been played (June 17): camping with my family in the Shining Rock
Wilderness region of the southern Appalachians. (Not that I would have
had a conclusive reason. To the contrary, I would have had a conclusive
reason to be camping with my family the evening ofJune 17 even if it had
meant missing Game 7.) The idea of a reason for doing something, or for
not doing something, is easy enough to grasp. Doing something, or not
doing something, can be, as in my example, a means to a desired end.
(The means might be both necessary and sufficient, neither necessary nor
[C]ertain same-sex unions already are functioning in their communities
as marriages. These gay and lesbian couples support and are supported
by the community's practices of marriage and family as a whole. With
these unions already in place, the task is not to reformulate marriage so
that gays and lesbians might enter. Instead, the task is to understand how
and why these same-sex unions fit so well, given that so many good argu-
ments are made against them.
9. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Law and the Moral Life, 11 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 383,
386 (1999).
10. Id. at 385.
11. Id. at 386.
12. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Light Sometimes Shines, TIKKUN, Sept.-Oct.
1998, at 16.
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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sufficient, necessary but not sufficient, or sufficient but not necessary.)
Doing something, or not doing something, can also be a desired end-or
both a desired end and a means to a desired end. If I were a sports writer,
watching the Bulls play in the 1998 NBA Finals would have been, for me, a
means as well as an end.
But when is a reason for doing something, or for not doing some-
thing, a "moral" reason? (If there had been a Game 7, would I have had a
"moral" reason not to be camping in the Appalachian wilderness the eve-
ning of June 17?) What kind of reason is a "moral" reason? What does it
mean to say that a reason is a "moral" reason? What is "morality" anyway?
Let us focus on actions of the most relevant sort: actions intended, at
least in part, to serve the welfare of another person. (By "action," I refer
to "not doing something" as well as to "doing something.") We can have
many different kinds of reasons for acting in order to serve rather than
ignore or even attack the welfare-the well-being, the needs, the inter-
ests-of another. I might have, for example, an economic reason for act-
ing to serve your welfare: I can't do what I want to do this weekend unless I
earn $100, and acting to serve your welfare is the only, or easiest, way for
me to do that. I might also have a reason for acting to serve your welfare
that does not depend on your ability or willingness to pay me for doing so.
This additional reason might be a moral reason. But, again, what is a
"moral" reason? When is a reason for acting to serve another's welfare a
"moral" reason?
Consider the following passage fromJudge Posner's Holmes Lectures:
Morality is the set of duties to others (not necessarily just other
people-the duties could run to animals as well, or, importantly,
to God) that are supposed to check our merely self-interested,
emotional, or sentimental reactions to serious questions of
human conduct. It is concerned with what we owe, rather than
what we are owed .... 13
We may infer from this passage that for Judge Posner to say that a
reason of the relevant sort-a reason for acting in order to serve another's
welfare-is a "moral" reason is to say that the reason is not, that it does not
appeal to, either one's self-interest or one's emotional or sentimental con-
cern for or attachment to the other person-or, indeed, on one's emo-
tional or sentimental concern for or attachment to any other person.
(Rather than say "one's emotional or sentimental concern for or attach-
13. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 4
(1999). Posner adds, where I have put the ellipsis: ".... except insofar as a sense of
entitlement (to happiness, self-fulfillment, an interesting life, an opportunity to
exercise our talents, to realize ourselves, and so on) might impose a duty on others
to help us get what we are entitled to." Posner's book, The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory, is a revised version of his Holmes Lectures, which were first published
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ment to" I will say simply "one's emotional concern (or concerns).") A
"moral" reason, in Posner's view, is meant to "check" both one's self-inter-
est and one's emotional concerns. 14 Posner's way of speaking ("duties to
others") fails to accommodate the common view that among the things
that one morally ought or ought not to do are things that one ought or
ought not to do to or for oneself-the common view, that is, that one has
moral duties to oneself as well as to others.1 5 But for present purposes let
us bracket that problem and inquire whether Posner's position about what
a "moral" reason is-Posner's understanding of "morality"-is otherwise
problematic. Posner's position is common among many contemporary
secular moral theorists.' 6 So in asking what a "moral" reason is, Posner's
position is a good place to begin.
II
What reason or reasons might one have, other than reasons that ap-
peal to one's self-interest or to one's emotional concerns or to both, for
acting in order to serve the welfare of another?
Imagine the following scenario. Sarah is a theist who believes that, in
the words of The First Letter ofJohn, "God is love."1 7 ("Whoever fails to love
does not know God, because God is love." 18 "God is love, and whoever
remains in love remains in God and God in him."19 ) Sarah also believes
that God's act of creating and sustaining the universe is an expression of
God/love. In particular, Sarah believes that human beings are the chil-
dren of God and sisters and brothers to one another,20 and that the per-
14. Posner's position does not deny that one's self-interest or emotional con-
cerns or both can support one's doing (or not doing) something that a "moral"
reason also supports one's doing. But if my self-interest or emotional concerns or
both lead me in one direction and a "moral" reason leads me in another, why
should I follow-what reason do I have to follow-the moral reason?
15. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1661 (discussing duty to self and others). At
one point, Posner refers not just to "others" but, even more extremely, to "un-
known" others. See id. (referring to "morality in its modern sense [as] a set of
duties toward unknown persons"). Even "in its modern sense," however, morality
is concerned with what we owe many "known" persons (e.g., spouse, children, par-
ents, friends, etc.) as well as what we owe "unknown persons."
16. For a discussion of how this view is particularly prevalent among moral
theorists in the Kantian tradition, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
17. 1 John 4:8 (New Jerusalem Bible).
18. Id.
19. 1 John 4:16.
20. Not that one has to be religious in any conventional or self-conscious
sense to believe that all human beings are sisters and brothers to one another. Cf
KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, THE HEART OF ALTRUISM: PERCEPTIONS OF A COMMON
HUMANITY 216 (1996):
[I]t is the [altruistic] perspective itself that constitutes the heart of altru-
ism. Without this particular perspective, there are no altruists .... [The
perspective] consists of a common perception, held by all altruists, that
they are strongly linked to others through a shared humanity. This self-
perception constitutes such a central core to altruists' identity that it
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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fect way of life for human beings-the most deeply satisfying way of life of
which human beings, as children of God and sisters and brothers to one
another, are capable-is one in which human beings abide Jesus' com-
mandment to "love one another; you must love one another just as I have
loved you." 21
leaves them with no choice in their behavior toward others. They are
John Donne's people. All life concerns them. Any death diminishes
them. Because they are a part of mankind.
21. 1 John 13:34. For Christians, the basic shape of the good life is indicated
by the instruction given by Jesus at a Passover seder on the eve of his execution: "I
give you a new commandment: love one another; you must love one anotherjust as
I have loved you." Id.; see also 1 John 15:12, 17. See generally THE LovE COMMAND-
MENTS: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Edmund N. Santurri
& William Werpehowski eds., 1992) [hereinafter LovE COMMANDMENTS]; GARTH L.
HALLETT, CHRISTIAN NEIGHBOR-LOVE: AN ASSESSMENT OF Six RIvAL VERSIONS
(1989).
The "one another" is radically inclusive:
You have heard how it was said, You will love your neighbor and hate your
enemy. But I say this to you, love your enemies and pray for those who
persecute you; so that you may be children of your Father in heaven, for
he causes his sun to rise on the bad as well as the good, and sends down
rain to fall on the upright and the wicked alike. For if you love those who
love you, what reward will you get? Do not even the tax collectors do as
much? And if you save your greetings for your brothers, are you doing
anything exceptional? Do not even the gentiles do as much? You must
therefore set no bounds to your love, just as your heavenly Father sets
none to his.
Matthew 5:43-48; see Luke 6:27-35. Recall, too, the Parable of the Good Samaritan:
But the man was anxious to justify himself and said to Jesus, "And who is
my neighbour?" In answerJesus said, "A man was once on his way down
from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell into the hands of bandits; they
stripped him, beat him and then made off, leaving him half dead. Now a
priest happened to be travelling down the same road, but when he saw
the man, he passed by on the other side. In the same way a Levite who
came to the place saw him, and passed by on the other side. But a Samar-
itan traveller who came on him was moved with compassion when he saw
him. He went up to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring oil and wine
on them. He then lifted him onto his own mount and took him to an inn
and looked after him. Next day, he took out two denarii and handed
them to the innkeeper and said, 'Look after him, and on my way back I
will make good any extra expense you have.' Which of these three, do
you think, proved himself a neighbour to the man who fell into the ban-
dits' hands?" [The man] replied, "The one who showed pity towards
him." Jesus said to him, "Go, and do the same yourself."
Luke 10:29-37. In The New Jerusalem Bible, a footnote attached to "Samaritan" ex-
plains that "[t]he contrast is between the element in Israel most strictly bound to
the law of love, and the heretic and stranger, ... from whom normally only hate
could be expected." Id. at n:h.
Such a conception of human good is not confined to Christianity or even to
the semitic spiritualities. For many Buddhists, for example, the good life centrally
involves compassion (karuna) for all sentient creatures and therefore for all human
beings. Moreover, one need not be religious to believe that the perfect way of life
for human beings-the most deeply satisfying way of life of which human beings,
as participants in a shared humanity, are capable-is one in which human beings
"love one another." See MONROE, supra note 20, at 238 ("We do good because that
7
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Sarah has thoroughly internalized Jesus' counsel to "love one another
just as I have loved you." Perhaps she has done so because of the way her
parents raised her, or perhaps her life just happened to unfold that way.
But suppose the question arises, why should anyone want to internalize
Jesus' counsel; what reason does anyone have to do so? The answer Sarah
would give would appeal to one's self-interest: As I said, Sarah believes that
the perfect way of life for human beings is one in which human beings
"love one another." "We are well aware that we have passed over from
death to life because we love our brothers. Whoever does not love, re-
mains in death."2 2
Sarah recently acted in a certain way, she recently did something, in
order to serve the welfare of several starving children in sub-Saharan Af-
rica, because she concluded that acting as she did was, all things consid-
ered, the most appropriate way for her to express her love for the
children-children to whom Sarah has no special relation and, indeed,
whom Sarah has never met and does not know and almost certainly will
never meet or know. Was Sarah's reason for acting as she did a "moral"
reason? It would be an extremely uncommon use of "moral" to insist that
Sarah's reason was not a moral reason. Yet, Sarah's reason does not satisfy
Posner's test, because it appeals directly to Sarah's emotional concern: Sa-
rah acted out of her love for the starving children. Sarah's love is what
Christians call, agape, as distinct from eros or philia.23 So, Sarah's reason
for acting as she did to serve the children's welfare is a powerful counter-
example to Posner's account of what a "moral" reason is.
(Moreover, Sarah's reason appeals indirectly to Sarah's self-interest,
in this sense: if the question were to arise, "Why should Sarah, or anyone
else, want to internalize Jesus' commandment to 'love one anotherjust as I
have loved you'?" the answer Sarah and like-minded believers would give is
an answer that appeals to one's self-interest: "Because the way to live the
most deeply satisfying life of which human beings, as children of God and
sisters and brothers to one another, are capable is to internalize Jesus'
commandment; it is actually to love one another as Jesus loved us." 24)
It bears emphasis that Sarah acted as she did to serve the children's
welfare not because God, understood as the metaphysically supreme legis-
is what makes us human, fully and richly human, and not just greedy and grasp-
ingly self-centered.").
22. 1 John 3:14.
23. The literature in Christian ethics on agape is voluminous. See HALLET,
supra note 21, at 33 (defining agape); STEPHEN J. POPE, THE EVOLUTION OF ALTRU-
ISM AND THE ORDERING OF LOVE 61 (1994); LOVE COMMANDMENTS, supra note 21, at
4; EDWARD COLLINS VACEK, S.J., LoVE, HUMAN AND DIVINE: THE HEART OF CHRIS-
TIAN ETHICS 151-91 (1994).
24. And if one is not committed to flourishing as a human being? "There is
perhaps nothing to say to a man who would like to be a centaur. Moral discourse
always presupposes the acceptance of humanity and the striving to be and to be-
come ever more fully human." ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND
POLITICS 196 (1975).
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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lator, commanded that she do so. For Sarah, God is not best understood
as a legislator, issuing commands that we should obey simply because they
are God's commands, or because God will punish us if we do not obey
them. A theistic religious vision does not necessarily include, though
some conventional theistic religious visions do include, a conception of
"God" as metaphysically supreme legislator, issuing directives for human
conduct. Indeed, a religious believer might well hold that such a "God"-
such an idol-is dead.2 5
Consider the question Socrates poses in Plato's Euthyphro. As Peter
Cicchino has articulated the question:
Do the gods love-or, to make this discussion truer to the mono-
theism of most religious people in our society, does God love-
what is holy or sacred (to hosion in Plato's dialogue) or is a thing
holy/sacred because God loves it? An equivalent way of posing
the question is "Does God will certain things because they are
good for us to do or refrain from doing or are certain things
good for us to do or refrain from doing because God wills
them?" 2
6
For Sarah, for whom God is love, not supreme legislator, some things
are good for us to do or refrain from doing not because God commands
them, but because God is what (who) God is, because the universe-the
universe created and sustained by God who is love in an act that is an
expression of God/love-is what it is, and, in particular, because we
human beings are who we are. Sarah believes that because God is what
God is, the universe is what it is, and we are who we are, and not because
of anything willed by a metaphysically supreme legislator, the perfect way
of life for us human beings-the most deeply satisfying way of life of which
we human beings are capable-is one in which we "love one another just
as I have loved you." 2 7
Moreover, Sarah acted as she did to serve the starving children's wel-
fare not because she feared eternal damnation if she did not-or even
because she longs for eternal union with God. Sarah may love God above
all else and long for eternal union with God, which union she may regard
as her greatest end, but if she does, such longing is not Sarah's reason for
25. Cf Charles Larmore, Beyond Religion and Enlightenment, 30 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 799, 799-802 (1993).
26. Letter from Peter Ciccino, American University School of Law, to Michael J.
Perry, University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest University (Sept. 2, 1998)
(quoted with permission) (on file with author). Cf William Ewald, Comparative
Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889, 2000 (1995)
(explaining that for Kant, "the concept of the Good is logically prior to the con-
cept of the Divinity").
27. Cf Steven D. Smith, Natural Law and Contemporary Moral Thought: A Guide
from the Perplexed, 42 AMERICAN J. Juus. 299, 325-26 (1997).
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acting as she did to serve the children's welfare. Sarah acted out of her
love (agape) for the children. 28
For some religious believers, like Sarah, the most powerful reason for
acting to serve the welfare of others, especially strangers-and, sometimes,
the sole reason-is a religiously based reason; it is, moreover, a reason that
appeals directly to one's emotional concern for the Other, as sister/
brother (and that, as I have explained, appeals indirectly to one's self-
interest). An account of what a "moral" reason is that excludes such a
reason-at least, an account that seeks to capture the common under-
standing and not to stipulate a wildly idiosyncratic understanding-is, in a
word, weird. No account of what a "moral" reason is that fails to include
such a reason for acting to serve another's welfare-a religiously based
reason that appeals to one's emotional concern for the Other-has much
currency in a pervasively religious culture, like ours, in which such a rea-
son is the paradigmatic "moral" reason. 29
In the scenario I sketched above, I have Sarah acting out of her love
for the starving children; love is the foundational emotion/sentiment that
moves Sarah to act to serve the welfare of the starving children. 30 In his
Holmes Lectures, however, Posner writes that:
28. See Timothy P. Jackson, The Disconsolation of Theology: Irony, Cruelty, and
Putting Charity First, 20 J. RELIcious ETHICS 1, 19 (1992) (arguing that "a future
heaven and/or hell ought not to play much of a role in [Christian] ethics,
whatever role they may play in cosmology"); Grace M.Jantzen, Do We Need Immortal-
ity?, 1 MOD. THEOLOGY 33, 43 (1984) ("Christian faith and Christian commitment
bases itself not first and foremost on a hope of survival of death, but on the intrin-
sic value of a relationship with God, without any reservations about what the future
holds-here or hereafter."). But cf J.L.A. Garcia, Deus Sive Natura: Must Natural
Lawyers Choose?, in NATURAL LAw, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 271, 272 (Robert P.
George ed., 1996) ("If acting immorally risks eternal damnation, then there is a
limit to how far one strays from prudence in following the moral law even onto the
gallows or into the torture chamber.").
29. Consider the opening paragraph of an article that appeared recently in
the New York Times, a pre-millennial article on the interface of science and religion:
As the century began, optimists could easily have convinced themselves
that by the time 2000 rolled around there would be nothing left for scien-
tists and theologians to argue about. Each would have long since agreed
on how to divvy up the intellectual terrain. Science would continue its
inevitable march towards a grand explanation of how the material world
works, leaving to religion the endless arguments over why the universe
came to be and how people ought to behave in it.
George Johnson, True Believers: Science and Religion Cross Their Lines in the Sand, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 1998, at 4. The final sentence of the paragraph reflects the com-
mon understanding that one of the principal tasks of religious inquiry (but notjust
of religious inquiry) is to discern how human beings, whether all or some, ought to
live their lives.
30. In the view of great German Catholic theologian Karl Rahner, not only is
there no tension between the commandment to love God and the commandment
to love one another, there is "a radical identity of the two loves." KARL RAHNER, 6
THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONs 231, 236 (1969). In the chapter entitled "Reflec-
tions on the Unity of the Love of Neighbor and the Love of God," Rahner wrote:
It is radically true, i.e. by an ontological and not merely 'moral' or psy-
chological necessity, that whoever does not love the brother whom he
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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sees, also cannot love God whom he does not see, and that one can love
God whom one does not see only by loving one's visible brother lovingly.
Id. at 247. Rahner's reference is to a passage in the First Letter ofJohn in which it
is written: "Anyone who says 'I love God' and hates his brother, is a liar, since
whoever does not love the brother whom he can see cannot love God whom he has
not seen." 1 John 4:20. In Rahner's view, it is only by loving one's neighbor that
one has achieved the ontological/existential state of being/consciousness that
constitutes "love of God," even though one may not "believe in God." See RAHNER,
supra, at 238-39. If Rahner is right, then there is, in the following sense, not two
great commandments, but one: Compliance with the first great commandment (to
love God) requires compliance with the second (to love one another), and compli-
ance with the second entails compliance with the first. See id. at 232. Consider, in
that regard, the Last Judgment passage in Matthew's Gospel:
When the Son of man comes in his glory, escorted by all the angels, then
he will take his seat on his throne of glory. All nations will be assembled
before him and he will separate people one from another as the shep-
herd separates sheep from goats. He will place the sheep on his fight
hand and the goats on his left. Then the King will say to those on his
right hand, "Come, you whom my Father has blessed, take as your heri-
tage the kingdom prepared for you since the foundation of the world.
For I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me
drink, I was a stranger and you made me welcome, lacking clothes and
you clothed me, sick and you visited me, in prison and you came to see
me." Then the upright will say to him in reply, "Lord, when did we see
you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you drink? When did we see
you a stranger and make you welcome, lacking clothes and clothe you?
When did we find you sick or in prison and go to see you?" And the King
will answer, "In truth I tell you, in so far as you did this to one of the least
of these brothers of mine, you did it to me." Then he will say to those on
his left hand, "Go away from me, with your curse upon you, to the eternal
fire prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry and you
never gave me food, I was thirsty and you never gave me anything to
drink, I was a stranger and you never made me welcome, lacking clothes
and you never clothed me, sick and in prison and you never visited me."
Then it will be their turn to ask, "Lord, when did we see you hungry or
thirsty, a stranger or lacking clothes, sick or in prison, and did not come
to your help?" Then he will answer, "In truth I tell you, in so far as you
neglected to do this to one of the least of these, you neglected to do it to
me." And they will go away to eternal punishment, and the upright to
eternal life.
Matthew 25:31-46. In Matthew's Gospel, these are Jesus' final words to his disciples
before the beginning of the passion narrative. Matthew states: 'Jesus had now fin-
ished all he wanted to say, and he told his disciples, 'It will be Passover, as you
know, in two days' time, and the Son of Man will be handed over to be crucified."'
Id. 26:1-2
It seems to follow, from Rahner's view, that it is a mistake, a confusion, to say
that one should love the Other because we love, or should love, God and God wants
us to-or because we fear, or should fear, God and God wants us to. We should say,
instead, that to love the Other (who is "sister/brother") just is to love God (who is
"parent")-and that we should achieve the ontological/existential state of being/
consciousness that constitutes "love of the Other" (equals "love of God") because
that state is the highest human good; to have achieved, that radically unalienated
condition is to have become truly, fully human. "We are well aware that we have
passed over from death to life because we love our brothers. Whoever does not
love, remains in death." 1 John 3:14.
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altruism ... is not primarily a moral sentiment .... When defined
broadly, as helping behavior not motivated by the promise of re-
ward or the threat of punishment, altruism is something that can
be and often is motivated by love, or by some dilute form of it
such as compassion or sympathy. And love and its cognates are
not, or at least need not be, moral sentiments. 31
Similarly, Posner declares that "[t] he moral emotions," including altruism
and love (between which, Posner later explains, he does "not intend to
draw a sharp [distinction] ,"32) "are morally neutral. Is Posner right that
love is not a moral sentiment, that it is morally neutral? 33
Thinkers have long found it useful to distinguish among different
kinds of love-in particular, among eros, philia, and agape.3 4 Recall Jesus'
commandment to "love one another; love one another just as I have loved
you." The kind of love Jesus urged his followers to bestow on one an-
other-which is also the kind of love he bestowed on them-is agape. love
of neighbor, where "neighbor" is understood in a radically inclusive
sense. 3 5 It is simply not true that such love-agape--is not a moral senti-
ment. Agape is not at all morally neutral. Agape is the very foundation of
Christian ethics36-a point John Noonan emphasizes in his response to
Posner's Holmes Lectures. 37 In reply to Noonan, Posner writes: "There is
selfish altruism ('reciprocal altruism,' for example) and selfish love; there
is also selfless altruism, which is a form of selfless love, as Noonan sug-
gests.38 My doubts concern the possibility of using this insight to "power
moral reasoning."39 In this puzzling reply, Posner seems to shift ground.
He seems to acknowledge that "selfless love" might be a moral sentiment
and not morally neutral, although, cautions Posner, "this insight" cannot
"power moral reasoning."40 Whatever Posner means to say here, the rele-
vant point is that, in the Gospel vision, one's love (agape) of "one another"
31. Posner, supra note 4, at 1641, 1658; see POSNER, supra note 13, at 37 ("Al-
truism typically is nonmoral-like love ...."). (At one point in his Holmes Lec-
tures, Posner distinguishes between revulsion based on "morality" and revulsion
based on "altruism." See Posner, supra note 4, at 1692 ("The revulsion against Na-
zism, although understandable without reference to morality, being based on al-
truism for the victims and fear of the perpetrators . . . .").) But see POSNER, supra
note 13, at 36 ("Some of us will make a sacrifice to help people we actually dislike;
this is not uncommon in the dealings people have with their aged parents. This
kind of altruism, when it is not just showing off, is the product of a genuine moral
sentiment. Call it dutiful or disinterested altruism.") (emphasis added).
32. Posner, supra note 5, at 1815.
33. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1664.
34. See VACEK, supra note 23, at 249-312.
35. See 1 John 13:34.
36. SeeJohn T. Noonan,Jr., Posner's Problematics, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1768, 1775
(1998).
37. See id.
38. Posner, supra note 5, at 1815.
39. Id.
40. See id.
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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(in the Gospel's radically inclusive sense of "one another") is the funda-
mental existential condition (sentiment, emotion, attitude) that animates
one's effort to serve the welfare of other human beings, even strangers like
him to whom the Good Samaritan ministered, 41 understood as beloved
children of God and one's sisters and brothers. So what if "this insight"
cannot "power moral reasoning?" A more important observation is that
agape is not opposed to reason but often requires reason as an instrument
of its own fulfillment: One's effort to serve another's welfare often re-
quires one to deliberate-to "reason"-about what will in fact serve an-
other's welfare, or about the best way, all things considered, to serve
another's welfare, or about how to accommodate other, competing con-
cerns, such as, for example, the welfare of the community.
III
The reason Sarah acted to serve the welfare of the starving children is
a counterexample to Posner's account of what a "moral" reason is, but it is
a religiously based reason. Posner might respond that he meant only to
give an account of what a non-religiously based "moral" reason is-an ac-
count, that is, of secular "moral" reason. 42 After all, Posner is explicit that
the "academic moralism" he derides is secular, not religious, in character:
I call theories of morality "moralism" to underscore their aim of
changing human behavior and "academic moralism" to distin-
guish academic moral philosophy from moral preaching outside
the academy .... I am interested in the type of moralizing that is,
or at least pretends to be, free from controversial metaphysical
commitments such as those of a believing Christian, and so might
conceivably appeal to the judges of our secular courts ...
[R] eligious arguments are not a part of academic moralism.43
It isn't obvious why, in giving an account of what a "moral" reason is,
we should distinguish between a religiously based reason and a secular
reason. The distinction seems ad hoc. Nonetheless, let's now consider
secular reasons for acting to serve another's welfare. Are there any such
reasons, other than reasons that appeal to one's self-interest or to one's
emotional concerns or to both? (If not, then, given Posner's account of
"moral, "there are no secular moral reasons!) Is Posner's account, of what
a "moral" reason is, plausible at least with respect to secular reasons for
acting to serve another's welfare?
Consider this response: One reason for acting to serve the welfare of
another-for example, by refraining from killing her-is that she, like
every other person, is "inviolable." To say that a person is "inviolable" is to
say, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, that the person is "not to be
41. See Luke 10:25-38.
42. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1648.
43. Id. at 1648, 1649.
2000]
13
Perry: What Is Morality Anyway
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
82 VILLANovA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45: p. 69
violated; not liable or allowed to suffer violence; to be kept sacredly free
from profanation, infraction, or assault."44 It is possible that by claiming
that every person, (or every human being), is inviolable, one is saying-as
a religious Jew, for example, or a Christian, would be saying-something
substantially equivalent to the proposition that every person is a child of
God and a sister/brother to oneself and is therefore inviolable. (As Hilary
Putnam has written, the moral image central to what Putnam calls the
Jerusalem-based religions "stresse[s] equality and also fraternity, as in the
metaphor of the whole human race as One Family, of all women and men
as sisters and brothers. '4 5)
But then the reason for acting to serve another's welfare is a relig-
iously based reason. We are now considering secular reasons, and it is far
from clear-very far-on what basis one who is not a religious believer,
one who is an agnostic or even an atheist, can claim (indeed, can believe)
that every person is inviolable: Why is it the case-in virtue of what is it the
case-that every person is, (in the words of the OED) "not to be violated;
not liable or allowed to suffer violence; to be kept sacredly free from profa-
nation, infraction, or assault?" 46 As Jeff McMahan has emphasized,
"[u]nderstanding the basis of our alleged inviolability is crucial both for
determining whether it is plausible to regard ourselves as inviolable, and
for fixing the boundaries of the class of inviolable beings. '47
44. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 51 (2d ed., 1989).
45. HILARV PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM 60-61 (1987). In an essay on
The Spirituality of The Talmud, Ben Zion Bokser and Baruch M. Bokser state: "From
this conception of man's place in the universe comes the sense of the supreme
sanctity of all human life. 'He who destroys one person has dealt a blow at the
entire universe, and he who sustains or saves one person has sustained the whole
world."' Ben Zion Bokser & Baruch M. Bokser, Introduction: The Spirituality of the
Talmud, in THE TALMUD: SELECTED WRITINGS 7 (1989). They continue:
The sanctity of life is not a function of national origin, religious affilia-
tion, or social status. In the sight of God, the humble citizen is the equal
of the person who occupies the highest office. As one talmudist put it:
"Heaven and earth I call to witness, whether it be an Israelite or pagan,
man or woman, slave or maidservant, according to the work of every
human being doth the Holy Spirit rest upon him."... As the rabbis put
it: "We are obligated to feed non-Jews residing among us even as we feed
Jews; we are obligated to visit their sick even as we visit the Jewish sick; we
are obligated to attend to the burial of their dead even as we attend to the
burial of the Jewish dead."
Id. at 30-31.
46. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 51 (2d ed., 1989).
47. In an otherwise laudatory review of a book by Frances Kamm, Jeff McMa-
han writes:
The burden of the third and final part of the volume is to explain why it
is generally not permissible for one to engage in killing even when, by
doing so, one could prevent a greater number of killings from occurring.
Here, Kamm's central contention is that people must be regarded as invi-
olable, as ends-in-themselves .... [Kamm's] arguments often raise diffi-
cult questions that the book fails to address. A conspicuous instance of
this is Kamm's failure to identify the basis of our moral inviolability. Un-
derstanding the basis of our alleged inviolability is crucial both for deter-
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Undeniably, the religious (i.e., Jewish and Christian) basis of the claim
that every person is inviolable is not appealing to everyone. It was very
unappealing to Nietzsche. And even for one to whom it is greatly appeal-
ing, it might not be credible. It is not credible, for example, to Jfirgen
Habermas, who has written:
[By confronting] the conscientious question about deliverance
for the annihilated victims[,] ... we become aware of the limits
of that transcendence from within which is directed to this world.
But this does not enable us to ascertain the countermovement of a
compensating transcendence from beyond. That the universal
covenant of fellowship would be able to be effective retroactively,
toward the past, only in the weak medium of our memory.., falls
short of our moral need. But the painful experience of a deficit
is still not a sufficient argument for the assumption of an "abso-
lute freedom which saves in death."4
8
But even if one finds incredible the religious basis of the claim that
every person is inviolable, the question persists why-on what (nonreli-
gious) basis-is every person inviolable? Consider Glenn Tinder's
assessment:
Nietzsche's stature is owing to the courage and profundity that
enabled him to make this all unmistakably clear. He delineated
with overpowering eloquence the consequences of giving up
Christianity, and every like view of the universe and humanity. His
approval of those consequences and his hatred of Christianity
give force to his argument. Many would like to think that there
are no consequences-that we can continue treasuring the life
and welfare, the civil rights and political authority, of every per-
son without believing in a God who renders such attitudes and
conduct compelling. Nietzsche shows that we cannot. We can-
not give up the Christian God-and the transcendence given other
names in other faiths-and go on as before. We must give up
Christian morality too. If the God-man is nothing more than an
illusion, the same thing is true of the idea that every individual
possesses incalculable worth. The standard of agape collapses. It
becomes explicable only on Nietzsche's terms: as a device by
mining whether it is plausible to regard ourselves as inviolable, and for
fixing the boundaries of the class of inviolable beings.
Jeff McMahan, When Not to Kill or Be Killed, N.Y. TIMES LITERARY Supp., Aug. 7, 1998,
at 31 (reviewing FRANCES KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY, VOLUME 2: RIGHTS, DUTIES,
AND STATUS (1997)). It is revealing that Kamm, one of the principal neo-Kantian
moral philosophers among the younger generation of secular moral theorists,
"conspicuously" fails in her otherwise rigorously argued book to tell her audience
why-in virtue of what-persons are inviolable.
48. Jfirgen Habermas, Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in This World,
in HABERMAS, MODERNrIY, AND PUBLIC THEOLOGY 226, 238 (Don S. Browning &
Francis Schussler Fiorenza eds., 1992).
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which the weak and failing exact from the strong and distin-
guished a deference they do not deserve. Thus the spiritual
center of Western politics fades and vanishes.
49
Is Tinder right? After Nietzsche., is it plausible to think that for one
for whom the universe is utterly bereft of transcendent meaning and is,
therefore, from a human point of view, absurd 5 0 the content of a morality
can be substantially equivalent to the content of a morality grounded in
the belief that human beings are children of God and sisters and brothers
to one another? Nietzsche declared: "Naivete: as if morality could survive
49. Glenn Tinder, Can We Be Good Without God: The Political Meaning of Christi-
anity, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1989, at 69, 80 (passages rearranged and emphasis added).
(For Tinder's book-length treatment of the relevant issues, see GLENN TINDER, THE
POLITICAL MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY: AN INTERPRETATION (1989)). Tinder's em-
phasis on the Christian tradition will surely and understandably be, for some non-
Christians, a provocative distraction from his fundamental point. Tinder's (and
Nietzsche's) point loses nothing, however, if the emphasis is placed not on the
Christian tradition but on the Jewish, for example. Recall the comment on the
Talmud quoted in supra note 45. Nor does the point lose anything if the emphasis
is put, for example, on the (Mahayana) Buddhist tradition, with its insistence on
compassion for all sentient creatures as the fitting response to the true-as distict
from the illusory-nature of the world.
50. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STArE 368 (1980).
Bruce Ackerman has announced: "There is no moral meaning hidden in the bow-
els of the universe." See also BERTRAND RUSSELL, MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 45-46
(1957):
That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they
were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves
and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms;
that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve
an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the
devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius,
are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that
the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried be-
neath the debris of a universe in ruins-all these things, if not quite be-
yond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects
them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only
on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation
henceforth be safely built.
Ackerman's declaration, like Russell's before him, brings to mind one of Nietz-
sche's passages:
Man a little, eccentric species of animal, which-fortunately-has its day;
all on earth a mere moment, an incident, an exception without conse-
quences, something of no importance to the general character of the
earth; the earth itself, like every star, a hiatus between two nothingness,
an event without plan, reason, will, self-consciousness, the worst kind of
necessity, stupid necessity-Something in us rebels against this view; the
serpent vanity says to us: "all that must be false, for it arouses indigna-
tion- Could all that not be merely appearance? And man, in spite of all,
as Kant says-"
FRIEDRICI- NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 169 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hol-
lingdale, trs., & Walter Kaufmann, ed., 1967).
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when the God who sanctions it is missing! The 'beyond' absolutely neces-
sary if faith in morality is to be maintained." 51
Let me pause to forestall a misunderstanding. My point here is not
that there can be no morality without God. 52 One obviously need not
believe in God to believe in and adhere to a morality. Many persons who
do not believe in God believe in and adhere to a morality. Nor is my point
that one cannot be good unless one believes in God. Many people who do
not believe in God are good-even saintly-just as many people who be-
lieve in God are not good. My point, which I am about to elaborate, is
simply that it is obscure on what basis one who is not a religious believer-
one who is an agnostic or an atheist-can claim that every person is
inviolable.
Imagine a cosmology according to which the universe is, finally and
radically, meaningless-or, even if meaningful in some sense, not mean-
ingful in a way hospitable to our deepest yearnings for what Abraham Hes-
chel called "ultimate relationship, ultimate belonging. '5 3 Consider, for
example, Clarence Darrow's bleak vision (as recounted by Paul Edwards):
51. NIETZCHE, supra note 50, at 147. Commenting on "anthropocentrism,
[which] by abolishing all horizons of significance, threatens us with a loss of mean-
ing and hence a trivialization of our predicament," Charles Taylor has written:
At one moment, we understand our situation as one of high tragedy,
alone in a silent universe, without intrinsic meaning, condemned to cre-
ate value. But at a later moment, the same doctrine, by its own inherent
bent, yields a flattened world, in which there aren't very meaningful
choices because there aren't any crucial issues.
CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 68 (1992).
52. In commenting on a draft of this essay, Peter Cicchino addressed "what
[he] took to be the suggestion that Nietzsche may have been right to see morality
in the coffin at God's funeral." Cicchino, supra note 26.
53. For the person deep in the grip of, the person claimed by, the problem of
meaning, "[t]he cry for meaning is a cry for ultimate relationship, for ultimate
belonging", wrote Heschel.
It is a cry in which all pretensions are abandoned. Are we alone in the
wilderness of time, alone in the dreadfully marvelous universe, of which
we are a part and where we feel forever like strangers? Is there a Pres-
ence to live by? A Presence worth living for, worth dying for? Is there a
way of living in the Presence?
Is there a way of living compatible with the Presence?
ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL, WHO Is MAN? 73 (1965); see FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE
BROTHERS KARAMAzov 235 (Norton ed., 1976) ("For the secret of man's being is
not only to live but to have something to live for. Without a stable conception of
the object of life, man would not consent to go on living, and would rather destroy
himself than remain on earth, though he had bread in abundance."). This is one
of the Grand Inquisitor's statements in chapter 5 of Book Five. Cf W.D. Joske,
Philosophy and the Meaning of Life, in THE MEANING OF LIFE 248, 250 (E.D. Klemke
ed., 1981) ("If, as Kurt Vonnegut speculates in The Sirens of Titan, the ultimate end
of human activity is the delivery of a small piece of steel to a wrecked space ship
wanting to continue ajourney of no importance whatsoever, the end would be too
trivial to justify the means."); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 586
(1981) ("If the cosmic role of human beings was to provide a negative lesson to
some others ('don't act like them') or to provide needed food for passing interga-
lactic travelers who were important, this would not suit our aspirations-not even if
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Darrow, one of the most compassionate men who ever lived,...
concluded that life was an "awful joke." . . . Darrow offered as
one of his reasons the apparent aimlessness of all that happens.
"This weary old world goes on, begetting, with birth and with liv-
ing and with death," he remarked in his moving plea for the boy-
murderers Loeb and Leopold, "and all of it is blind from the
beginning to the end." Elsewhere he wrote: "Life is like a ship on
the sea, tossed by every wave and by every wind; a ship headed for
no port and no harbor, with no rudder, no compass, no pilot;
simply floating for a time, then lost in the waves." In addition to
the aimlessness of life and the universe, there is the fact of death.
"I love my friends," wrote Darrow, "but they all must come to a
tragic end." Death is more terrible the more one is attached to
things in the world. Life, he concludes, is "not worth while," and
he adds.., that "it is an unpleasant interruption of nothing, and
the best thing you can say of it is that it does not last long."54
One prominent contemporary proponent of a Darrowian cosmology,
the physicist, and Nobel laureate, Steven Weinberg, "finds his own world-
view 'chilling and impersonal.' He cannot understand people who treat
the absence of God and of God's heaven as unimportant."55 Where is
there a place in a cosmological view like Darrow's or Weinberg's for the
conviction that every person is inviolable to gain a foothold?
Indeed, for one who believes that the universe is utterly bereft of tran-
scendent meaning, why-in virtue of what-is every person inviolable?
56
Judge Posner apparently shares my lack of comprehension:
Thomas Nagel is a self-proclaimed atheist, yet he thinks that no
one could really believe that 'we each have value only to ourselves
and to those who care about us.' Well, to whom then? Who con-
fers value on us without caring for us in the way that we care for
afterwards the intergalactic travelers smacked their lips and said that we tasted
good.").
54. Paul Edwards, Life, Meaning and Value of 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
467, 468 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). Whether Clarence Darrow was in fact "one of
the most compassionate men who ever lived" is open to question. For a revisionist
view of Darrow, see GARY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS,
chs. 8-9 (1990).
55. See John Leslie, Is It All Quite Simple? The Physicist's Search for a Theory of
Everything, N.Y. TIMES LITERARY SuPP., Jan. 29, 1993, at 3 (reviewing, inter alia,
STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY (1992)). Cf Paul Davies, The Holy
Grail of Physics, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Mar. 7, 1993, at 11 (reviewing, inter alia,
Weinberg's book) ("Reductionism [in physics] may be a fruitful research method,
but it is a bleak philosophy .... If the world is but a collection of inert atoms
interacting through blind and purposeless forces, what happens to ... the mean-
ing of life?").
56. Ronald Dworkin has attempted to answer this question, but his answer, as
I have explained elsewhere, succeeds only in showing that Dworkin doesn't under-
stand the question. See PERRY, FOUR INQUIRIES, supra note 3, at 25-39.
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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friends, family, and sometimes members of larger human com-
munities? Who else but the God in whom Nagel does not
believe? 57
I am inclined to concur in R.H. Tawney's view: "The essence of all
morality is this: to believe that every human being is of infinite impor-
tance, and therefore that no consideration of expediency can justify the
oppression of one by another. But to believe this it is necessary to believe
in God."58 It bears emphasis that one need not be a religious believer to
concur in Tawney's view. Jeffrie Murphy, for example, insists that it is, for
him, "very difficult-perhaps impossible-to embrace religious convic-
tions," but he nonetheless claims that "the liberal theory of rights requires
a doctrine of human dignity, preciousness and sacredness that cannot be
utterly detached from a belief in God or at least from a world view that
would be properly called religious in some metaphysically profound
sense." 5 9 Murphy continues:
[T]he idea that fundamental moral values may require [reli-
gious] convictions is not one to be welcomed with joy [by non-
religious enthusiasts of the liberal theory of rights]. This idea
generates tensions and appears to force choices that some of us
would prefer not to make. But it still might be true for all of that.60
57. Posner, supra note 4, at 1687 (citing THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WoRD 130
(1997)). Cf James Boyd White, Talking About Religion in the Language of Law: Impos-
sible but Necessary, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 177, 197-99 (1998) (explaining why he has
difficulty understanding what one who is not religious believer might be saying in
affirming Declaration of Independence's insistence on "equality" of all human
beings).
58. R.H. TAWNEY'S COMMONPLACE BOOK 67 (J.M. Winter & D.M. Joslin eds.,
1972). Tawney wrote the quoted passage in his diary on August 13, 1913. Three
days earlier, on August 10, he quoted in his diary T.W. Price, Midland secretary of
the Workers' Educational Association and lecturer at Birmingham University: "Un-
less a man believes in spiritual things-in God-altruism is absurd. What is the
sense of it? Why shld [sic] a man recognize any obligation to his neighbour, unless
he believes that he has been put in the world for a special purpose and has a
special work to perform in it? A man's relations to his neighbour become mean-
ingless unless there is some higher power above them both." Cf Dennis Prager,
Can We Be Good Without God?, 9 ULTIMATE ISSUES 3, 4 (1993) ("If there is no God,
you and I are purely the culmination of chance, pure random chance. And
whether I kick your face in, or support you charitably, the universe is as indifferent
to that as whether a star in another galaxy blows up tonight.").
59. Jeffrie Murphy, Afterword: Constitutionalism, Moral Skepticism, and Religious
Belief in CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION 239, 248 (Alan S.
Rosenbaum ed., 1988).
60. Id. (emphasis added); see Czeslaw Milosz, The Religious Imagination at 2000,
NEW PERSPECTIVES Q., Fall 1997, at 32:
What has been surprising in the post-Cold War period are those
beautiful and deeply moving words pronounced with veneration in places
like Prague and Warsaw, words which pertain to the old repertory of the
rights of man and the dignity of the person.
I wonder at this phenomenon because maybe underneath there is an
abyss. After all, those ideas had their foundation in religion, and I am
20001
19
Perry: What Is Morality Anyway
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILLA1ovA LAW REVIEW
Nietzsche asked: "Now suppose that belief in God has vanished: the
question presents itself anew: 'who speaks?"' 6 1 Echoing Nietzsche's ques-
tion a brutal century later, Art Leff wrote:
Napalming babies is bad.
Starving the poor is wicked.
Buying and selling each other is depraved.
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin,
and Pol Pot-and General Custer too-have earned salvation.
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned. There is in the
world such a thing as evil.
[All together now:] Sez who? God help us. 62
IV
Some contemporary moral theorists (some of the "academic moral-
ists" Posner attacks in his Holmes Lectures) have recently been talking
about what they call "the sources of [moral] normativity." 63 They have
not over-optimistic as to the survival of religion in a scientific-technologi-
cal civilization. Notions that seemed buried forever have suddenly been
resurrected. But how long can they stay afloat if the bottom is taken out?
61. NIETZSCHE, supra note 50, at 157.
62. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229,
1249 (1979); see Noonan, supra note 36, at 1768: "These three propositions [if no
lawgiver, no law; if no law, no judge; if no judge, no judgment], which have the
strength of self-evidence, sum up the predicament of most of the academic moral-
ists who are Judge Posner's targets. These moralists acknowledge no lawgiver and
no judge. Their vulnerability is patent. Their attempts to pronounce moral judg-
ments are doomed to failure."
63. See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD with G. A. COHEN ET AL., THE SOURCES OF
NORMATIVnTY (Onora O'Neill ed., 1996); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Worthy of
Praise, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1776, 1777, 1789-91 (1998).
Has Christine Korsgaard, the eminent Kant scholar (and, as I draft this essay,
chair of the Harvard Department of Philosophy), joined Ronald Dworkin in claim-
ing that the value (dignity, worth, sacredness, inviolability) of the Other is not
objective but merely subjective? In addressing "the questions of the kind of value
humanity has in Kant's ethics and what gives it that value," Korsgaard has written:
More recently, especially in The Sources ofNormativity, I have come to think
of the value we place even on ourselves as also conferred. To that extent,
I agree.., that there is a continuity between the value of humanity and
the value of other things: they are all the results of our own acts of confer-
ring value.
Christine M. Korsgaard, Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self. A Reply to
Ginsborg, Guyer, and Schneewind, 109 ETHICS 49, 63 (1998). Cf Elshtain, supra note
9, at 400 (commenting critically on MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODI-
TIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS
(1996)):
But [the problem with this view is that], given that all value is constructed
by humans beings, there is nothing that simply "has value," nothing in
which value inheres. So we are in an exclusively anthropocentric uni-
verse: No value exists apart from, or outside of, humans placing it upon
objects or concepts. This means we are unable to say that there are
things, like babies, that should never be treated as commodities.
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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been trying to identify one or more such sources; they have been trying to
identify what it is that yields, or might yield, what they take to be our moral
obligation to serve the welfare of another by acting in certain ways, espe-
cially by refraining from harming another in certain ways. The reasons for
which they search are secular reasons that appeal neither to one's self-
interest nor to one's emotional concerns. 64 But are there any such rea-
sons? Are there any secular sources of normativity other than self-interest
and emotional concern? In the preceding section, we considered one re-
sponse: the putative inviolability of every person. The problem with that
response, I suggested, is twofold: If religiously based, the response is not
secular and, moreover, does appeal to one's emotional concern; if not re-
ligiously based, the response, though secular, seems altogether obscure.
Let's now consider three further responses.
First: "A fundamental reason for acting in certain ways 65 to serve the
welfare of another-for example, by feeding him or her-is that morality
demands that one do so, even if one's self-interest and/or emotional con-
cerns do not." (By "another," I mean, at the limit, the radically Other: the
person to whom one has no special relation and, indeed, whom one has
never met and does not know and almost certainly will never meet or
know.) This response, however, is conspicuously unhelpful. To say that
"morality" requires one to do (or not to do) something is to say that
"moral" reasons require one to do (or not to do) it. But the fundamental
issue before us is: What is a "moral" reason? The issue, in particular, is
whether it makes sense to say that "moral" reasons are reasons (for acting
to serve another's welfare) that appeal neither to one's self-interest nor to
one's emotional concerns. After all, Sarah's religiously based reason,
which is commonly regarded as a "moral" reason, appeals directly to her
emotional concern for the Other (and indirectly to her self-interest). The
question therefore arises whether there are any secular reasons for acting
to serve another's welfare, other than reasons that appeal to one's self-
interest or to one's emotional concerns or to both?66
Second: "A fundamental reason for acting (in certain ways) to serve
the welfare of another-that is, a fundamental reason other than self-in-
terest or emotional concern-is that one would act irrationally if one
chose not to do so." Imagine that you and two friends emerge from a visit
to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.
64. See infta note 73 and accompanying text.
65. Perhaps at all times, perhaps only at certain times; perhaps in all places,
perhaps only in certain places; perhaps under all conditions, perhaps only under
certain conditions.
66. It has been suggested to me, in discussion, that "because X is the morally
right thing to do" is a moral reason that appeals neither to one's self-interest nor
to one's emotional concerns. But "because X is the morally right thing to do" is
not a moral reason. The reason we have for thinking that X is the morally right
thing for us to do-if we have such a reason-is a moral reason. The question I'm
addressing is whether there are any moral reasons that do not appeal either to
one's self-interest or to one's emotional concerns.
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What sort of breakdown, what sort of failure, does the Holocaust repre-
sent, you ask. One friend's reply: a failure of rationality. The other friend
has a different response: a failure of love. Which answer gets closer to the
heart of the matter, in your view? Which answer is more resonant? Does
the immorality of the monstrously evil and heartbreaking acts you saw de-
picted all around you as you walked through the museum inhere in the
Nazis (and others) acting irrationally? Or does it inhere in the Nazis' fail-
ure to recognize that the Jews, too, were their sisters and brothers? In any
event, it is obscure why-or in what sense-it would be irrational for one
to make a choice on the basis of one's self-interest or emotional concerns
(or both) rather than make a competing choice on a basis that, ex hy-
pothesi, does not involve one's self-interest or emotional concerns. 6 7
67. I do not mean to deny that it might be irrational, because contrary to
one's self-interest, all things considered, for one to violate certain normative limits
on one's choices. But we are now searching for a secular reason for acting to serve
another's welfare that does not involve self-interest (or emotional concern).
For an example of a morality based on rational self-interest, see David
Gauthier, Rational Constraint: Some Last Words, in CoTrRACTARLANISM AND RATIONAL
CHOICE: ESSAYS ON DAVID GAUTHIER'S MoRALs By AGREEMENT 323, 330 (Peter Val-
lentyne ed., 1991) [hereinafter CONTRACTARIANISM] (arguing "that rational per-
sons will recognize a role for constraints, both unilateral and mutual, in their
choices and decisions, that rational persons would agree ex ante on certain mutual
constraints were they able to do so, and that rational persons will frequently com-
ply with those mutual constraints in their interactions"). As one commentator has
observed, "[Gauthier's] main interest is to give an account of rational and impar-
tial constraints on conduct. If this does not capture the traditional conception of
morality, so much the worse for the traditional conception. Rationality-not mo-
rality-is the important notion for him." Peter Vallentyne, Gauthier's Three Projects,
in CONTRACTARIANISM , supra, at 2.
[Gauthier's contractarian] view of the relationship between the indi-
vidual and society has some implications about which even the most com-
mitted contractarians are uneasy. If justice is wholly a matter of
reciprocity, do we have any obligation to support people who are so se-
verely handicapped that they can offer us nothing in return? ...
Gauthier has to concede that the handicapped lie 'beyond the pale
of morality tied to mutuality'; if we have moral duties in these cases,
[Gauthier's] theory cannot account for them. Each of us may feel sympa-
thy for the handicapped, and if so, the welfare of the handicapped will be
among the ends we pursue; but this is a matter of preference, not moral
obligation.
Cf Robert Sugden, The Contractarian Enterprise, in RATIONALITY, JUSTICE AND THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT: THEMES FROM MORAL By AGREEMENT 1, 8 (David Gauthier &
Robert Sugden eds., 1993):
At the core of [Gauthier's project] is the thought that traditional moral
theory relies on the supposed existence of entities, such as God or good-
ness, which are external to human life yet somehow matter. A defensible
morality should dispense with such mysterious entities, and accept that
life has no meaning outside itself.
Gauthier has written that Morals By Agreement:
[I]s an attempt to challenge Nietzsche's prescient remark, "As the will to
truth ... gains self-consciousness ... morality will gradually perish." It is
an attempt to write moral theory for adults, for persons who live con-
sciously in a post-anthropomorphic, post-theocentric, post-technocratic
world. It is an attempt to allay the fear, or suspicion, or hope, that with-
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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I see no point in saying that it is more rational to prefer one's
neighbors to one's family in the event of a nuclear holocaust, or
more rational to prefer leveling off incomes around the world to
preserving the institutions of liberal Western societies. To use
the word "rational" to commend one's chosen solution to such
dilemmas, or to use the term "yielding to the force of the better
argument" to characterize one's way of making up one's mind, is
to pay oneself an empty compliment.
68
Third: "A fundamental reason for acting to serve the welfare of an-
other is that our innately human sentiments-in particular, our innately
human altruism-lead us to do so." (This, or something like it, might be
Martha Nussbaum's response. 69 ) One who doubts that "our" altruistic
out a foundation in objective value or objective reason, in sympathy or in
sociality, the moral enterprise must fail.
In the end, however, Gauthier does not challenge Nietzsche so much as he em-
braces a Nietzschean conception ofjustice. Nietzsche wrote:
Justice (fairness) originates among those who are approximately equally
powerful, as Thucydides.. .comprehended correctly .... [J]ustice is repay-
ment and exchange on the assumption of an approximately equal power
position... Justice naturally derives from prudent concern with self-pres-
ervation; that means, from the egoism of the consideration: "Why should
I harm myself uselessly and perhaps not attain my goal anyway?"
Friedrich Nietzsche, All Too Human, in BASIc WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE 148 (Walter
Kaufman trans., 1973).
68. Richard Rorty, Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY.
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 9, 19 (Ron Bontekoe & Marietta Stepaniants eds.,
1997) [hereinafter Rorty, Justice].
A prominent secular argument for human rights is Alan Gewirth's. Gewirth's
argument has been extremely controversial, to say the least. See, e.g., GEWIRTH'S
ETHICAL RATIONALISM (Edward Regis ed., 1984); BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OFJUSTICE
285-88 (1989). For a careful restatement and defense of Gewirth's argument, see
DERYCK BEYLEVELD, THE DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY: AN ANALYSIS AND DE-
FENSE OF ALAN GEWIRTH'S ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY(1991). For a skeptical review of Beyleveld's book, see NICK FOTION, 101 ETHICS
579 (1993). It bears emphasis that, as Garth Hallett has observed, "Gewirth does
not argue that the [Principle of Generic Consistency] is true, but only that any
agent who wishes to be rational must accept it." Hallett then writes, in a footnote:
In The Dialectical Necessity of Morality, 15, Deryck Beyleveld makes this
point more clearly than does Gewirth: "Use of the dialectically necessary
method implies that Gewirth is not attempting to establish the PGC itself
as a truth. What he attempts to establish as a necessary truth is the propo-
sition 'A PPA [Prospective Purposive Agent] contradicts that it is a PPA if
it does not accept/act in accordance with the PGC."'
Id. at 184 n. 29
69. In an essay critiquing "skepticism about practical reason in literature and
in the law," Nussbaum asserts that "the good of other human beings is an end
worth pursuing in its own right, apart from its effect on [one's] own pleasure or
happiness .... Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literature
and the Law, 107 HARv. L. REv. 714, 718 (1994). It is clear, in her essay, that by
"other human beings" Nussbaum means not just some other human beings but all
other human beings. But why is the good of every human being an end worth
pursuing in its own right? Nussbaum does not say. She merely reports, in the final
paragraph of her essay, that "it seems to be a mark of the human being to care for
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sentiments are a feature of our species nature-indeed, who rejects the
idea that there is any such thing as "human" nature-might put the point
differently: "A fundamental reason for acting in certain ways to serve the
welfare of another is that our Eurocentric sentiments lead us to do so."
(This might be Richard Rorty's response. 70 ) The conspicuous problem
others and feel disturbance when bad things happen to them." Id. at 744; see
Martha C. Nussbaum, Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion, 13 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 27
(1996). Now, few will deny that it seems to be a mark of the normal human being
to care for some other human beings-the members of one's family, say, or even of
one's tribe or nation or race or religion. But it is not a mark of all (normal)
human beings-it is not a mark of "the human being" as such-to care for all
other human beings. Consider Richard Rorty's comparison of "the rather rare
figure of the psychopath, the person who has no concern for any human being
other than himself[,]" to "the much more common case: the person whose treat-
ment of a rather narrow range of featherless bipeds is morally impeccable, but who
remains indifferent to the suffering of those outside this range, the ones he or she
thinks of as pseudohumans." Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Senti-
mentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECrURES 1993 111, 123-24
[hereinafter Rorty, Human Rights]. (According to Rorty, moral philosophy, to its
detriment, has "systematically neglected" the latter in favor of the former. Id. at
124.) Rorty's "much more common case" is also much more common than the
person at the other extreme from the psychopath: someone who cares deeply
about the authentic well-being of every human being. We sometimes mark just
how uncommon such persons are, in the real world, by calling them "saints."
70. Rorty denies what, according to Rorty,
[H]istoricist thinkers [ever since Hegel] ... have denied[:] that there is
such a thing as "human nature" or the "deepest level of the self." Their
strategy has been to insist that socialization, and thus historical circum-
stance, goes all the way down-that there is nothing "beneath" socializa-
tion or prior to history which is definatory of the human. Such writers
tell us that the question "What is it to be a human being?" should be
replaced by questions like "What is it to inhabit a rich twentieth-century
democratic society?
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xiii [hereinafter RORTY,
CONTINGENCY]. Rorty writes approvingly of "[t]his historicist turn," which, he says,
"has helped free us, gradually but steadily, from theology and metaphysics-from
the temptation to look for an escape from time and chance. It has helped us
substitute Freedom for Truth as the goal of thinking and of social progress." Id.
For an excellent critique of this and related aspects of Rorty's views, see Timothy P.
Jackson, The Theory and Practice of Discomfort: Richard Rorty and Pragmatism, 51 THO-
MIST 270 (1987).
Richard Rorty has therefore recommended that we simply stop trying to de-
fend the idea of human rights; in particular, he has recommended that we aban-
don what he calls our "human rights foundationalism" which, in Rorty's view, has
proven a futile project. See Rorty, Human Rights, supra note 69, at 116. For
example:
Kant's account of the respect due to rational agents tells you that you
should extend the respect you feel for people like yourself to all feather-
less bipeds. This is an excellent suggestion, a good formula for secular-
izing the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man. But it has never
been backed up by an argument based on neutral premises, and it never
will be.
Id. at 124-25. Human rights foundationalism is not merely futile; it is, according to
Rorty, "outmoded." Id. at 116. There is, says Rorty, a better project for us (i.e., for
those of us who embrace the cause of human rights): "We see our task as a matter
of making our own culture-the human rights culture-more self-conscious and
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morepowerful, rather than of demonstrating its superiority to other cultures by an
appeal to something transcultural" (like the putative inviolability/sacredness/
whatever of every human being). Id. at 117-18; see RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra, at
189-98.
But is it really, enough, when confronted by intellectual or, worse, existential
repudiations of human rights, to retreat, pace Rorty, into a kind of ethnocen-
trism-at one point Rorty refers to "our Eurocentric human rights culture"-pro-
claiming proudly and loudly that although among us late-twentieth-century North
Americans and Western Europeans (and perhaps a few others), a great fondness
for human rights, or for "the moral point of view," is nothing more than a cultur-
ally acquired taste, it is our acquired taste and we are willing, if necessary, to fight
and even die for it. Rorty, Human Rights, supra note 69, at 126. For a discussion of
this acquired taste, see infra note 93 and accompanying text. Not even among all
of us late-twentieth-century North Americans, etc., has the taste-the cultural pref-
erence-for human rights been acquired. Moreover, why shouldn't those of us
who have acquired a fondness for human rights try to disabuse ourselves of that
fondness (if it is only an acquired taste)-at least, why shouldn't we try to moder-
ate that fondness-once it becomes clear that indulging a fondness for human
rights can be, economically, militarily, etc., a rather costly proposition? Most im-
portantly, if the fondness for human rights some of us have is, at bottom, nothing
more than an acquired taste, what is there to say to those who have not acquired
the taste-and who might even have acquired a taste for violating (what we call)
human rights-other than, perhaps, "Try it, you'll like it (maybe)?" Indeed, Rorty
has recommended that we say something to that effect:
[T]he rhetoric we Westerners use in trying to get everyone to be more
like us would be improved if we were more frankly ethnocentric, and less
professedly universalist. It would be better to say: Here is what we in the
West look like as a result of ceasing to hold slaves, beginning to educate
women, separating church and state, and so on. Here is what happened
after we started treating certain distinctions between people as arbitrary
rather than fraught with moral significance. If you would try treating
them that way, you might like the results.
Rorty, Justice, supra note 68, at 19-20.
"Fraternity is an inclination of the heart," writes Rorty, "one that produces a
sense of shame at having much when others have little. It is not the sort of thing
that anybody can have a theory about or that people can be argued into having."
Richard Rorty, Fraternity Reigns: The Case for a Society Based Not on Rights But on
Unselfishness, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at 155, 157 [hereinafter Rorty, Fraternity].
Rorty suggests that we try to convert others to our human rights culture-that we
try to change their hearts-partly through a process of "manipulating sentiments,
[of] sentimental education." Rorty, Human Rights, supra note 69, at 119, 122. But
in what sense is it a progress, and not merely a change, of sentiments, if the new
sentiments don't more accurately reflect a truth about the Other, namely, that the
Other is-really is-sacred, that the Other is, somehow, sister/brother? In any
event, in the view of most of us who embrace the cause of human rights, the funda-
mental wrong done, when human rights are violated, is not that our sentiments-
the sentiments of "our Eurocentric human rights culture"-are offended. The
fundamental wrong done is much deeper than that: It is that, somehow, the very
order of the world-the normative order of the world-is transgressed.
We might be quite wrong to believe-it might be false to believe-that the
world has a normative order that is transgressed by violations of human rights.
Relatedly, the belief might be false that "fraternity" is not just "an inclination of the
heart" but an inclination of the heart that reflects-that is rooted in and animated
by-perhaps the deepest truth about the normative order of the world, a truth that
yields Jesus' "new commandment: love one another; you must love one another
just as I have loved you." John 13:34. Rorty, however, does not argue that it is a
false belief that the normative order of the world is transgressed by violations of
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with these responses, however, is that neither response gives a reason of
the sort for which we are now searching: a secular reason for acting (in
certain ways) to serve another's welfare that does not appeal to one's emo-
tional concerns (or to one's self-interest). Each response gives a reason
that appeals to an overriding emotional concern that we are imagined to
have: in the case of the first response, an emotional concern that the re-
spondent imagines to be an innately human sentiment or attitude; in the
case of the second response, an emotional concern that the respondent
imagines to be a culturally specific ("Eurocentric?") sentiment or attitude.
I began this section by asking whether there are any secular reasons
for acting to serve the welfare of another-any reasons other than the
putative inviolability of every person-that appeal neither to one's self-
human rights and that fraternity is just an inclination of the heart. Whether or not
it is a false belief is not the sort of issue the "pragmatist" Rorty finds it useful to
address; indeed, it is the sort of issue he finds it useful to marginalize. See Rorty,
Human Rights, supra note 69, at 119. If the idea of human rights is ineliminably
religious, then human rights foundationalism is, finally, a theological project. In
Rorty's view, however, theology is not a useful conversation. See, e.g., Richard
Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1, 2 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Rorty, Religion]. I am skeptical, however, that we can, without serious costs,
marginalize the issue. There is not only the question I have already posed: In what
sense is it a progress of sentiments, and not merely a change? There are other
important problems. For example: If we have no reason to believe that the world
has a normative order that is transgressed by violations of human rights-at least,
if we have no reason to be other than agnostic about the issue-and if we nonethe-
less coerce others, and perhaps even, at the limit, kill others, in the name of pro-
tecting human rights, then are we coercing and killing in the name of nothing but
our sentiments, our preferences, our "inclination of the heart?" Does Rorty want
to deny that it would be deeply problematic for us to coerce and kill in the name
of nothing but our sentiments/preferences? Does Rorty want to say something
like this: "It's a brutal world out there. It's either them or us. It's either their
culture or ours-either their sentiments/preferences or ours. It's not that might
makes right. It's just that there is no right, only might. May our might, not theirs,
prevail!" Rorty did once say something fully congruent with that position:
[W]hen the secret police come, when the torturers violate the innocent,
there is nothing to be said to them of the form "There is something
within you which you are betraying. Though you embody the practices of
a totalitarian society which will endure forever, there is something be-
yond those practices which condemns you."
RIcHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (EssAYS: 1972-1980) xlii (1982)
[hereinafter ROR'IY, CONSEQUENCES].
Tim Jackson has asked, in commenting on Rorty's views: "Can one imagine
dying for irony's sake?" Jackson, supra note 28, at 10. We can also ask: Can one
imagine killing for irony's sake?
Outside our philosophical study... we don't think we're merely "expres-
sing our acceptance" of norms calling for mutual respect and social jus-
tice when we make (sometimes great) personal sacrifices in order to
comply with these norms. We act as if we think the authority of these
norms is not "in our heads" or traceable only to societal conventions and
our (cognitive or affective) reactions to them, but "real."
JEAN E. HAMPTON, THE AUTHORITY OF REASON 120 (Richard Healey ed., 1998)
(Thanks to George Wright for calling this passage to my attention.)
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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interest nor to one's emotional concerns. I have been unable to locate a
single such reason.
Recall what, for Judge Posner, it means to say that a reason for acting
to serve another's welfare is a "moral" reason: The reason is not-it does
not appeal to-either one's self-interest or one's emotional or sentimental
concern for or attachment to another. A "moral" reason, in Posner's view,
is meant to "check" both one's self-interest and one's emotional concerns.
However, Posner's position, about what a "moral" reason is, now seems
mistaken: There are no discernible reasons for acting to serve another's
welfare, neither any religiously based reasons nor any secular reasons, that
do not appeal to one's self-interest-perhaps by appealing to what is in the
interest of the community, or a community, with which one identifies and
on whose collective welfare (one believes) one's own individual welfare
depends-or to one's emotional concerns. In the real world, then, if not
in every moral theorist's study, one's reasons for acting to serve the welfare
of another, no less than one's reasons for other kinds of intentional ac-
tion, appeal to one's self-interest or to one's emotional concerns or to
both. This conclusion would seem altogether unremarkable-like the
conclusion that the earth is (almost) round-were it not for so much con-
temporary moral theory that has suggested otherwise.
71
71. See ROGER SCRUTON, SEXUAL DESIRE: A MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE EROTIC
325, 326 (1986):
The weakness of the Kantian position lies in its attribution of a "motivat-
ing force" to reason-in its denial of Hume's principle that reason alone
cannot be a motive to action. The Aristotelian position involves no com-
mitment to the idea of a "pure practical reason". It recognises that practi-
cal reasoning concludes in action only because it begins in desire. The
"practical syllogism" has a practical premise, and to the agent with evil
desires no reason can be given that will, by its sheer force as a reason,
suffice to make him good.
... Aristotle's invocation of happiness, as the final end of human
conduct, is essentially correct. Happiness is the single final answer to the
question "why do that?", the answer that survives the conflict with every
rival interest or desire. In referring to happiness we refer, not to the
satisfaction of impulses, but to the fulfillment of the person....
But what is happiness? Kant dismissed the idea as empty: happiness,
he argued, simply stands for the generality of human desires: it means
different things for different people, and provides no coherent motive of
its own. Following Aristotle, however, I shall propose an idea of happi-
ness as a kind of "flourishing."
See also Stephen Scott, Motive and Justification, 85J. PHIL. 479, 499 (1988):
When he was deliberating about how to live, St. Augustine asked, "What
does anything matter, if it does not have to do with happiness?" His ques-
tion requires explanation, because he is not advising selfishness nor the
reduction of other people to utilities, and even qualification, because
other things can have some weight. All the same, the answer he expects is
obviously right: only a happy life matters conclusively. If I had a clear
view of it, I could have no motive to decline it, I could regret nothing by
accepting it, I would have nothing about which to deliberate further.
On the term "happiness," compare Julia Annas, Virtue and Eudaimonism, 15
Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 37, 53 n.35 (1998):
20001
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Of course, the emotional concerns that persons have vary, sometimes
enormously, among persons and communities. As do beliefs about what is
good, or bad, for those for whom one is concerned. And so the moralities
that persons and communities have-the moralities they practice, whether
or not they also preach them-vary too, sometimes enormously. Different
moralities-competing moralities-are grounded both in different emo-
tional or sentimental concerns or attachments and in different beliefs
about what is good, or bad, for human beings, whether some human be-
ings or, at the limit, all human beings. Still, there appear to be no reasons
for acting to serve another's welfare that do not appeal to one's self-inter-
est or to one's emotional concerns. My reference here is not to the merely
textbook moralities that academic moralists teach in their classes, but to
real, flesh-and-blood moralities-the moralities, however ugly, that differ-
ent human communities across time and space have actually lived.72
I should note here that my criticism of Judge Posner's account of
"moral" reasons is less a criticism of Posner than of contemporary secular
moral theorists in the Kantian tradition, who have influenced Posner's un-
derstanding of the "moral" by insisting, in one way or another, that a rea-
son that appeals to one's self-interest or emotional concerns is not a
"moral" reason. 73 As Posner himself notes, "Kant's footprints are all over
Despite the differences between eudaimonia and happiness which I have
explored in this essay, and which are striking to philosophers reflecting
on virtue and happiness, "happiness" is clearly the correct translation for
eudaimonia in ancient literature of all kinds, and it would be a mistake to
conclude that we should translate eudaimonia by some other term.
with, Richard Taylor, Ancient Wisdom and Modern Folly, 13 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL.
54, 57, 58 (1988):
The Greek eudaimonia is always translated "happiness," which is unfortu-
nate, for the meaning we attach to the word happiness is thin indeed com-
pared to what the ancients meant by eudaimonia. Fulfillment might be a
better term, though this, too, fails to capture the richness of the original
term .... The concept of happiness in modern philosophy, as well as in
popular thinking, is superficial indeed in comparison.
72. See Robin W. Lovin & Frank E. Reynolds, Focus Introduction, 14 J. RELI-
Gious ETHICs 48, 56-57 (1986):
[M] oral norms are closely linked to beliefs about the facts of human life
and the world in which human life is set .... To know what people find
good in human action, we must know something about the powers and
vulnerabilities they find characteristically human, and about how they ex-
plain the constraints that nature, power, finitude, and mortality impose
on persons .... [W]hen they formulate moral norms and impose them
on themselves and others [, persons] ... are trying to formulate relation-
ships between realities and human purposes that allow them "to live as
[they] would in a world that is the way it is."
73. See Richard Rorty, Justice, supra note 68, at 11-12:
Would it be a good idea to treat 'justice" as the name for loyalty to a
certain very large group, the name for our current largest loyalty, rather
than the name for something distinct from loyalty? Could we replace the
notion of 'Justice" with that of loyalty to that group-for example, one's
fellow-citizens, or the human species, or all living things? Would any-
thing be lost by this replacement?
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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modern moral theory."74 Moreover, Posner's account of "moral" reasons
is only a secondary aspect of his Holmes Lectures. Posner's primary point
is that "the type of moral theory I call 'academic moralism' . . . does not
provide a solid basis for moral judgments, let alone for legal ones."75 "My
thesis has a strong form and a weak one. The strong form ... is that moral
theory does not provide a solid basis for moraljudgments. The weak form
is that even if moral theory can provide a solid basis for some moral judg-
ments, it should not be used as a basis for legaljudgments." 7 6 His princi-
pal "effort [is] to show, not that moral philosophy as a whole, much less
morality, is bunk, but only that the subset of moral philosophy that I call
academic moralism is incapable of contributing significantly to the resolu-
tion of moral or legal issues ...."77
Moral philosophers who remain loyal to Kant are likely to think that
a lot would be lost. Kantians typically insist that justice springs from rea-
son, and loyalty from sentiment. Only reason, they say, can impose uni-
versal and unconditional moral obligations, and our obligation to be just
is of this sort. It is on another level from the sort of affectional relations
that create loyalty. Jurgen Habermas is our most prominent contempo-
rary philosopher to insist on this Kantian way of looking at things: the
thinker least willing to blur either the line between reason and sentiment,
or the line between universal validity and historical consensus. But con-
temporary philosophers who depart from Kant, either in the direction of
Hume (like Annette Baier) or in the direction of Hegel (like Charles
Taylor) or in that of Aristotle (like Alasdair MacIntyre), are not so
sure....
What Kant would describe as [a conflict] between moral obligation
and sentiment, or between reason and sentiment, is, on a non-Kantian
account of the matter, a conflict between one set of loyalties and another
set of loyalties. The idea of a universal moral obligation to respect human
dignity gets replaced by the idea of loyalty to a very large group-the
human species.
See also Simon Blackburn, Am I Right? N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., Feb. 28, 1999, at 24
(reviewing T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1999)). Simon Black-
burn writes that "[w] e can still do moral philosophy if we recognize that many of
our concerns have passion and desire as their ancestors rather than truth and rea-
son." Referring to "the view that reasons that are seen only in the pull of the will
and of love are not real reasons at all," Blackburn says: "[W]hen we reflect what a
cold picture of human nature that [view] implies, I think we should find it rather
sad." For a devastating critique of Scanlon's book, see Colin McGinn, Reasons and
Unreasons, NEW REPUBLIC, May 24, 1999, at 34 (book review).
74. Posner, supra note 4, at 1664 n.48. Cf Elshtain, supra note 9, at 392:
"[T]he task of defending moral propositions and principles is overtaken increas-
ingly by neo-Kantian philosophers or post-structuralists who aim to undermine the
neo-Kantian enterprise."
75. Posner, supra note 4, at 1638, 1639 (passages rearranged).
76. Id. at 1639. For Posner's explanation of what he means by "academic
moralism," see text accompanying supra note 31.
77. Posner, supra note 4, at 1655. (Posner adds, where I have put the ellipsis:
"or to the improvement of personal behavior"). See id. at 1822-23.
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V
As I noted at the beginning of this Essay, although talk about moral-
ity, mainly in the form of moral argument, is pervasive in the contempo-
rary legal academy, it is often obscure what we citizens of the legal
academy, and others, are talking about-and often clear that we are not
all talking about the same thing-when we talk (argue) about "morality."
We are now in a position to address a question that is a variation on the
question that is the title of this essay: What is "moral" argument about?
When is the subject matter of an argument such that we call it a "moral"
argument?
"Moral" argument is often, and fundamentally, about this:
Which human beings ought we to care about-which ones, that
is, besides those we already happen to care about, those we al-
ready happen to be emotionally or sentimentally concerned for
or attached to: ourselves, our families, our tribes, and so on? Var-
iations on the question: Which human beings ought to be the
beneficiaries of our respect; the welfare, the well-being, of which
human beings ought to be the object of our concern? Which
human beings are subjects of justice;78 which are inviolable (or
"sacred")? All human beings, or only some?79
78. For a discussion, see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
79. Recall Richard Rorty's comparison of "the rather rare figure of the psy-
chopath, the person who has no concern for any human being other than him-
self[,]" to "the much more common case: the person whose treatment of a rather
narrow range of featherless bipeds is morally impeccable, but who remains indif-
ferent to the suffering of those outside this range, the ones he or she thinks of as
pseudohumans."
There is a related question, but it is really just a variation on the question
about which human beings are inviolable: Who is a human being; that is, what
members of the species Homo sapiens are truly, fully human? Women? Non-
whites? Jews? Cast as the claim that only some individuals are human beings, the
claim that only some human beings are inviolable has been, and remains, quite
common. According to Nazi ideology, for example, the Jews were pseudohumans.
SeeJohannes Morsink, World War Two and the Universal Declaration, 15 HUM. RTS. Q.
357, 363 (1993). There are countless other examples, past and present:
Serbian murderers and rapists do not think of themselves as violating
human rights. Further they are not doing these things to fellow human
beings, but to Muslims. They are not being inhuman, but rather are dis-
criminating between the true humans and the pseudohumans. They are
making the same sort of distinction as the Crusaders made between the
humans and the infidel dogs, and the Black Muslims make between
humans and blue-eyed devils. [Thomas Jefferson] was able both to own
slaves and to think it self-evident that all men are endowed by their crea-
tor with certain inalienable rights. He had convinced himself that the
consciousness of Blacks, like that of animals, "participates more of sensa-
tion than reflection." Like the Serbs, Mr. Jefferson did not think of him-
self as violating human rights.
The Serbs take themselves to be acting in the interests of true hu-
manity by purifying the world of pseudohumanity.
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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(But, as Charles Taylor has emphasized, "Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy
has tended to see morality as concerned with questions of what we ought
to do and to occlude or exclude questions about what it is good to be or
what it is good to love."80 )
"Moral" argument is also often about this:
What is good-truly good-for those we should care about in-
cluding ourselves, and what is bad for them? In particular: What
are the requirements of one's well-being? (Again, the "one" may
be, at one extreme, a particular human being or, at the other,
each and every human being.) What is friendly to the achieve-
ment of one's well-being, and what is hostile to it? What is con-
ducive to or even constitutive of one's human well-being, and
what impedes or even destroys it?8
1
Finally, "moral" argument is often about priorities among conflicting
goods:
Should I act in a way that is good for "A" (someone I should care
about) in one respect but bad for her in another? Or in away
that is good for "A" but not good, or even bad, for "B" (someone
else I should care about)? Or in a way that is good for me but
not good, or even bad, for you? (That, according to the Gospel
vision, I should love the Other does not mean that I should not
love myself too. According to the Gospel vision, I should love
the Other "as myself'. 8 2) Or in a way that is good for my family
Rorty, Human Rights, supra note 69, at 112, 125. Cf Elshtain, supra note 9, at 385
(referring to "the truths we have come to understand about human beings, the
sort of creatures they are, and the kind of treatment that should be theirs simply by
virtue of their humanness").
80. Taylor, Murdoch & Moral Philosophy, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added).
81. Cf D.J. O'CONNOR, AQUINAS AND NATURAL LAw 57 (1968): "In so far as
any common core can be found to the principal versions of the natural law theory,
it seems to amount to the statement that the basic principles of morals and legisla-
tion are, in some sense or other, objective, accessible to reason and based on human
nature." Id. Of course, achieving well-being is not an either-or matter, but a mat-
ter of degree.
82. See Matthew 22:34-40.
But when the Pharisees heard that he had silenced the Sadducees they
got together and, to put him to the test, one of them put a further ques-
tion, 'Master, which is the greatest commandment of the Law?' Jesus said
to him, 'You must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all
your soul, and with all your mind. This is the greatest and the first com-
mandment. The second resembles it: You must love your neighbor as
yourself On these two commandments hang the whole Law, and the
Prophets too.
Id. (emphasis added); see Mark 12:28-34; Luke 10:25-28. For a discussion on the
relation between the two commandments, see supra note 21 and accompanying
text. Cf J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 243 (1977):
D.D. Raphael, in THE STANDARD OF MORALS, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARIS-
TOTELIAN SocIETv 75 (1974-75) follows Edward Ullendorff in pointing out
that whereas 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself represents the
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(tribe, nation, etc.) but not good, or even bad, for your
family?
8 3
"Moral" argument is often and preeminently about one or more of
these three large subjects: Which human beings ought we to care about?
What is truly good for those we should care about-and what is bad for
them? And how should we resolve conflicts between goods-in particular,
between what is good for some we should care about and what is good for
others we should care about? As between the first and second questions,
the second-or at least a particular instance of it-is, existentially, the
more fundamental of the two. Normally, one cares about oneself; one is
committed to one's own welfare. So, a particular instance of the question
"What is truly good for those we do or should care about?" is the question
"What is truly good for oneself?"8 4 And a particular instance of that ques-
tion, in turn, is "Which human beings is it truly good for one to care
about?" 85 But it is useful, I think, to keep the two questions distinct:
Which human beings ought we to care about? And what is truly good for
those we do or should care about-and what is bad for them?
Consider the first-and the most fundamental-of the three basic
"moral" questions I have identified: Which human beings ought we to care
about? Some religions give a radically inclusive answer-for example:
"Love one another; love one anotherjust as I have loved you." (Again, the
"one another" is radically inclusive.8 6) According to the Gospel vision, we
have reason to care about every human being-indeed, we have reason to
love (in the sense of agape) every human being. We have reason to respect
every human being; we have reason to be concerned about about the well-
being of every human being. All human beings are subjects of justice; all
are inviolable.
Greek of the Septuagint (Leviticus 19:18) and of the New Testament, the
Hebrew from which the former is derived means rather 'You shall treat
your neighbour lovingly, for he is like yourself.'
83. See generally GARTH L. HALLETT, PRIORITIES AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1998);
see also PETER UNGER, LMNG HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE
(1996).
84. See generally Scott, supra note 71 (discussing Augustine).
85. According to the Gospel vision, the answer is "Each and every other
human being, because each and every other human being is a child of God and a
sister/brother to oneself." No life better befits us as God's children, no life better
fulfills us as beings created as God has created us, than to "love one another"just
as Jesus loved us (according to the Gospel vision). See 1 John 3:14. "We are well
aware that we have passed over from death to life because we love our brothers.
Whoever does not love, remains in death." As I asked earlier: Is it plausible to
think that for one for whom the universe is utterly bereft of transcendent meaning
and is, therefore, from a human point of view, absurd, the content of a morality
can be substantially equivalent to the content of a morality grounded in the belief
that human beings are children of God and sisters and brothers to one another?
86. For a discussion, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Much of modern secular moral philosophy reflects its religious gene-
ology in giving a similarly (i.e., radically) inclusive answer.87 Indeed, the
proposition that every human being is inviolable (or some functionally
equivalent proposition) is axiomatic for so many secular moralities that
many secular moral philosophers have come to speak of "the moral point
of view" as that view according to which "every person [has] some sort of
equal status."88 Bernard Williams has noted that:
[I]t is often thought that no concern is truly moral unless it is
marked by this universality. For morality, the ethical constituency
is always the same: the universal constituency. An allegiance to a
smaller group, the loyalties to family or country, would have to be
justified from the outside inward, by an argument that explained
how it was a good thing that people should have allegiances that
were less than universal. 89
But, as I said earlier, I have no idea on what basis one who is not a
religious believer can give a radically inclusive answer-can say, for exam-
ple, say that each and every human being is inviolable. Let me put the
point somewhat differently. Assume one asks: Why ought we to care-what
reason do we have to care, if any-about every human being; why ought we
to respect every human being; why ought we to be concerned about the
well-being of every human being; why are all human beings subjects of
justice; why are all inviolable? Christianity has a response to such inquiry,
though one might not find the response even a little persuasive: Every
human being is a child of God and a sister or brother to oneself, and no
life better befits us as God's children, no life better fulfills us as beings
created as God has created us (imago Dei), than to "love one another" just
as Jesus loved us. "We are well aware that we have passed over from death
to life because we love our brothers. Whoever does not love, remains in
death."90 (Indeed, one might, like Nietzsche, find the response distaste-
ful.) Put aside the question whether any nonreligious ("secular") re-
sponse to such inquiry is persuasive. (You may believe that no religious
response is persuasive.) The prior question is whether any nonreligious
response to such inquiry is truly responsive. Listen, in that regard, to
Jfirgen Habermas: "It is true that a philosophy that thinks postmetaphysi-
cally cannot answer the question that [David] Tracy... calls attention to:
why be moral at all?"9 1 (Here, the question "why be moral at all?" is the
87. There are exceptions-for example, David Gauthier. See generally, supra
notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text.
88. JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IM-
PORTANCE 239 (1987).
89. See BERNARD WILLIAMs, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 14 (1985).
90. 1 John 3:14.
91. Habermas, supra note 48, at 239. What Habermas then goes on to say is
really quite remarkable:
At the same time, however, this philosophy can show why this ques-
tion does not arise meaningfully for communicatively socialized individu-
2000]
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question "why accept the moral point of view"-i.e., the view according to
which "every person [has] some sort of equal status."92 )
Let me conclude with this thought: If no nonreligious response is
truly responsive, perhaps it is at least partly because in the real world, if
not in every academic moralist's study, such an inquiry is, finally, religious
als. We acquire our moral intuitions in our parents' home, not in school.
And moral insights tell us that we do not have any good reasons for be-
having otherwise: for this, no self-surpassing of morality is necessary. It is
true that we often behave otherwise, but we do so with a bad conscience.
The first half of the sentence attests to the weakness of the motivational
power of good reasons; the second half attests that rational motivation by
reasons is more than nothing [auch nicht nichts ist-moral convictions do
not allow themselves to be overridden without resistance.
Id. Let's put aside the fact that "we" acquire our moral "intuitions" in many places
besides (or in addition to) our parents' home-in the streets, for example. The
more important point, for present purposes, is that we do not all acquire the same
moral intuitions. Some of us acquire moral intuitions that enable us to ignore,
and perhaps even to brutalize, the other without any pangs of "conscience." It is
incredible that in the waning days of this unbearably brutal century, Habermas-
writing in Germany of all places-could suggest otherwise. We need not even look
at the oppressors themselves; we need look only at those whose passivity makes
them complicitors. The real world is full of what Primo Levi called "us-ism." See
Nathan Stoltzfus, Dissent in Nazi Germany, ATLANTIC, Sept. 1992, at 87, 94:
Those on the Rosenstrasse who risked their lives for Jews did not express
opposition to anti-semitic policies per se. They displayed primarily what
the late Primo Levi, a survivor of Auschwitz, called 'selfishness extended
to the person closest to you ... us-ism.' In most of the stories I have
heard of Aryans who risked their lives for Jews to whom they were mar-
ried, they withdrew to safety, one by one, the moment their loved ones
were released. Their protests bring home to us the iron limits, the tragi-
cally narrow borders, of us-ism.
The effort to evade the why-be-moral question by distinguishing between "reasons"
and "motives" is unavailing. See Henry B. Veatch, Modern Ethics, Teleology, and Love
of Self 75 MONIsT 52, 60 (1992):
[T]he stock answer given to this question ["Why should I be moral?"] has
long been one of trying to distinguish between a reason and a motive for
being moral. For surely, it is argued, if I recognize something to be my
duty, then I surely have a reason to perform the required action, even
though I have no motive for performing it. In fact, even to ask for a
motive for doing something, when one already has a reason for doing it,
would seem to be at once gratuitous and unnecessary-at least so it is
argued. Unhappily, though, the argument has a dubious air about it at
best. For does it amount to anything more than trying to prove a point by
first attempting to make a distinction, implying that the distinction is no
mere distinction, but a distinction with a difference-viz, the distinction
between a reason and a motive. But then, having exploited the distinc-
tion, and yet at the same time insinuating that one might conceivably
have a reason for doing something, but no motive for doing it, the argu-
ment draws to its conclusion by surreptitiously taking advantage of the
fact that there possibly is no real distinction between a reason and a mo-
tive after all, so that if one has a reason for doing a thing, then one has a
motive for doing it as well. In other words, it's as if the argument only
succeeds by taking back with its left hand what it had originally given with
its right.
92. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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(or metaphysical) in character, and therefore no response that strenu-
ously avoids the inevitable, connected religious questions makes much
sense. In the real world, one's response to such an inquiry has long been
intimately bound up with one's response-one's answers-to certain
other fundamental questions: Who are we?; where did we come from; what
is our origin, our beginning? Where are we going; what is our destiny, our
end?93 What is the meaning of suffering? Of evil? Of death? And there is
the cardinal question, the question that comprises many of the others: Is
human life ultimately meaningful or, instead, ultimately bereft of mean-
ing, meaningless, absurd?94 If any questions are fundamental, these ques-
tions-"religious or limit questions" 9 5-are fundamental. Such
questions-"naive" questions, "questions with no answers", "barriers that
cannot be breached" 96 -are "the most serious and difficult ... that any
human being or society must face ... ."97 John Paul II is surely right in his
recent encyclical, Fides et Ratio, that such questions "have their common
93. See HESCHEL, supra note 53, at 28. "In an old rabbinic text three other
questions are suggested: 'Whence did you come?' 'Whither are you going?' 'Before
whom are you destined to give account? "' The questions Tolstoy asked, and Gau-
guin in, say, his great Tahiti triptych, completed just before he died ('Where Do
We Come From? What Are We? Where Are We Going?'), are the eternal questions
children ask more intensely, unremittingly, and subtly than we sometimes imag-
ine." ROBERT COLES, THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN 37 (1990). "All people by
nature desire to know the mystery from which they come and to which they go."
DENISE LARDNER CARMODY & JOHN TULLY CARMODY, WESTERN WAYS TO THE CENTER:
AN INTRODUcTION TO RELIGIONS OF THE WEST 198-99 (1983).
94. Communities, especially historically extended communities-"tradi-
tions"-are the principal matrices of religious answers to such questions:
Not the individual man nor a single generation by its own power, can
erect the bridge that leads to God. Faith is the achievement of many
generations, an effort accumulated over centuries. Many of its ideas are
as the light of the star that left its source a long time ago. Many enigmatic
songs, unfathomable today, are the resonance of voices of bygone times.
There is a collective memory of God in the human spirit, and it is this
memory which is the main source of our faith.
Abraham Heschel, Faith, in 10 THE RECONSTRUcTIONIsT, Nov. 3 & 17 (1944). For a
later statement on faith, incorporating some of the original essay, see ABRAHAM J.
HESCHEL, Man IS NOT ALONE 159-76 (1951).
95. DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY. RELIGION, HERMENEUTICS, HOPE
86 (1987).
96. In Milan Kundera's The Unbearable Lightness of Being, the narrator, refer-
ring to "the questions that had been going through Tereza's head since she was a
child," says that:
[T]he only truly serious questions are ones that even a child can formu-
late. Only the most naive of questions are truly serious. They are the
questions with no answers. A question with no answer is a barrier than
cannot be breached. In other words, it is questions with no answers that
set the limits of human possibilities, describe the boundaries of human
existence.
MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 139 (1984).
97. DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAgINATION 4 (1981). Tracy adds:
To formulate such questions honestly and well, to respond to them with
passion and rigor, is the work of all theology .... Religions ask and re-
spond to such fundamental questions... Theologians, by definition, risk
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source is the quest for meaning which had always compelled the human
heart" and that "the answer given to these questions decides the direction
which people seek to give to their lives."98
an intellectual life on the wager that religious traditions can be studied as
authentic responses to just such questions.
98. JOHN PAUL 1I, ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON: FIDES ET
RATIO, issued on Sept. 14, 1998. In the introduction to Fides et Ratio, John Paul II
writes:
Moreover, a cursory glance at ancient history shows clearly how in differ-
ent parts of the world, with their different cultures, there arise at the
same time the fundamental questions which pervade human life: Who am
I? Where have I come from and where am I going? Why is there evil?
What is there after this life? These are the questions which we find in the
sacred writings of Israel and also in the Veda and the Avesta; we find
them in the writings of Confucius and Lao-Tze, and in the preaching of
Tirthankara and Buddha; they appear in the poetry of Homer and in the
tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles as they do in the philosophical writ-
ings of Plato and Aristotle. They are questions which have their common
source in the quest for meaning which has always compelled the human
heart. In fact, the answer given to these questions decides the direction
which people seek to give to their lives.
Id. at Introduction, pt.1; see id. chp. 3, pt. 26 (noting that Fides et Ratio would more
accurately be named Fides et Philosophia). We find a similar statement in the Sec-
ond Vatican Council's Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian
Religions (Nostra Aetate, 1):
People look to their different religions for an answer to the unsolved rid-
dles of human existence. The problems that weigh heavily on people's
hearts are the same today as in ages past. What is humanity? What is the
meaning and purpose of life? Where does suffering originate, and what
end does it serve? How can genuine happiness be found? What happens
at death? What is judgement? What reward follows death? And finally,
what is the ultimate mystery, beyond human explanation, which em-
braces our entire existence, from which we take our origin and toward
which we tend?
Why should we think that the "academic moralists" Posner condemns in his
Holmes Lectures have some specialized knowledge, some expertise, that enables
them to struggle with one or more of these questions-including, in particular, the
question "Which human beings ought we to care about?"-more effectively than
other persons can or do, both other persons inside the academy and other persons
outside it? That we should so think far from obvious. How well anyone struggles
with such questions is a separate matter.
Consider, too, the second of the two large "moral" inquiries: What is good-truly
good-for those we do or should care about (including ourselves)? And what is bad for
them? What are the requirements of well-being, whether the well-being of some human beings
or that of each and evety human being? What is conducive to or even constitutive of well-
being, and what impedes or even destroys it? Why should we think that academic moral-
ists are, as such, more "expert" than other persons (both inside and outside the
academy) at pursuing instances of this inquiry? Imagine this multiple choice ques-
tion: "Of the following, who are best prepared, in virtue of training and practice, to
address difficult, controversial questions about the requirements of human well-
being, the conditions of human fulfillment? (a) psychologists; (b) anthropolo-
gists; (c) pastoral counselors; (d) social workers; (e) academic moralists." It's an
impossible call as among (a)-(d), but isn't (e) easily ruled out as a serious possibil-
ity? A suggestive comment by Michele Moody-Adams, in her book Fieldwork in Fa-
miliar Places, is apt here: "[T]here is often more to be learned from the engaged
moral inquiry of 'workmanlike' moral agents and inquirers than from the disen-
[Vol. 45: p. 69
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gaged speculations of moral theorists and social scientists." MICHELE M. MooDY-
ADAMS, FIELDWORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY 224
(1997). Cf Cicchino, supra note 26:
As someone who has spent his adult life-as a Jesuit and as an attorney-
in direct services to poor people, to prisoners, to the homeless, to gay and
lesbian youth, I am amazed at the lack of such direct experience with
poor and suffering human beings among my friends and colleagues in
the academy and especially among those who write academic moral phi-
losophy. Pedro Arrupe, former General Superior of the Society ofJesus,
used to exhort all Jesuits, especially those in intellectual service, to go to
the soup kitchens, shelters, and prisons and, at a minimum, tithe time to
the materially poor and socially disenfranchised. This, I take it, was no
more than an extension of what Ignatius had done when he allowed
Jesuits to act as advisors to the bishops at the Council of Trent: eachJesuit
was to serve several hours each day in hospitals for the poor. And medie-
val hospitals were about as hellish as human institutions get. Arrupe's
exhortations can also be seen as integral to the praxis-reflection model,
and its demand for existential integrity, that the theology of liberation in
Latin America had developed in the 1970s.
Posner certainly doesn't think that academic moralists are especially well posi-
tioned to discern what morality requires. In his view, they are especially poorly
positioned. According to Posner, "the fruitful moral debates take place outside
the precincts of academic moralism." Posner, supra note 4, at 1642.
2000]
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